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The Trump administration assumed office armed with
promises to eradicate unlawful immigration through an all-out
assault. There would be no exceptions; everyone was a priority.1 The
administration equated migrants with criminals in statement after
statement.2 President Obama’s “[f]elons not families” became a
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1 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“We cannot
faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United States if we exempt classes or categories
of removable aliens from potential enforcement.”). To implement this Executive Order (EO),
then-Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary John Kelly revoked the “Morton
memo,” a 2010memorandum from then-Immigration andCustomsEnforcement (ICE)Director
John Morton, which established priorities for immigration officers to follow when enforcing
immigration laws. SeeMemorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y Homeland Sec., on Enforcement of
the Immigration Laws to Serve theNational Interest to KevinMcAleenan, Acting Comm’r U.S.
Customs & Border Prot, Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Lori
Scialabba, Acting Dir. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Joseph B. Maher, Acting Gen.
Counsel, Dimple Shah, Acting Assistant Sec. for Int’l Affairs, & Chip Fulghum, Acting
Undersec’y for Mgmt. (Feb. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Kelly Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-
National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH5L-77FH]; Memorandum from JohnMorton on Civil
ImmigrationEnforcement: Priorities for theApprehension, Detention, andRemoval of Aliens to
all ICEEmployees (June 30, 2010) [hereinafterMortonMemo] https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/
releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/AL8W-VNLJ].
2 On the campaign trail, President Trump’s speeches created an inextricable link
between migrants and criminal behavior, insisting on severe immigration enforcement as a
means to a safer end. See, e.g., Transcript: Donald Trump’s Full Immigration Speech,
Annotated, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-donald-
trump-immigration-speech-transcript-20160831-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/HG9
K-TRQ4] (stating that “deadly, non-enforcement policies that allow thousands of criminal
aliens to freely roam our streets, walk around, do whatever they want to do, [commit] crime
all over the place”). President Trump continued this migrant-criminal rhetoric. See Alana
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rallying cry for the Trump administration to deport both as swiftly
as possible.3 Immigration arrests climbed steadily alongwith theuse
of dragnet tactics intended to instill fear in immigrants and their
families regardless of circumstance.4 With talk of walls, raids, and
rapists,5 immigrants withdrew to their living rooms, closed their
shades,6 and tried to limit exposure to anyone who might call in
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).7 The consequences
were predictable: fewer crimes were reported; children were absent
from schools and doctors’ offices; parents missed work; shops closed;
and communities faltered.8 Cities and states have responded with a
Abramson, ‘I Can Be More Presidential Than Any President.’ Read Trump’s Ohio Rally
Speech, TIME (July 26, 2017), http://time.com/4874161/donald-trump-transcript-youngstown-
ohio/ [https://perma.cc/NQ63-NMR8] (“The predators and criminal aliens who poison our
communities with drugs and prey on innocent young people, these beautiful, beautiful,
innocent young people will, will find no safe haven anywhere in our country. And you’ve seen
the stories about some of these animals.”).
3 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017); Press Release,
White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Immigration Reform (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [https://perma.cc/L6C2-TWSX];
Morton Memo, supra note 1; Team Fix, The CNN-Telemundo Republican Debate Transcript,
Annotated, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/
2016/02/25/the-cnn-telemundo-republican-debate-transcript-annotated/?utm_term=.900f3d
2a7a11 [https://perma.cc/3MBP-WA6Z]; Vivian Yee, Immigrants Hide, Fearing Capture on
‘AnyCorner,’N.Y.TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/immigrants
-deportation-fears.html [https://perma.cc/EFX3-TQF5]; Ryan Devereaux, Trump Targets
Undocumented Families, Not Felons, in First 100 Days, INTERCEPT (Apr. 28, 2017), https://
theintercept.com/2017/04/28/100-days-of-deportations-trump-policies-terrorize-immigrant-
families-and-neglect-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/XY4W-HNZ6].
4 See, e.g., Stephen Dinan, No Apologies: ICE Chief Says Illegal Immigrants Should
Live inFear ofDeportation,WASH.TIMES (June13, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2017/jun/13/thomas-homan-ice-chief-says-illegal-immigrants-sho/ [https://perma.cc/KAP2-L9Q6].
5 See James Doubek, ICEDetainsMore Than 100 in Los Angeles-Area Immigration
Raids, NAT’LPUB. RADIO (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/15/
585973495/ice-detains-more-than-100-in-los-angeles-area-immigration-raids [https://perma.cc/
M9XH-8UE5]; Sam Levin,Hundreds Arrested in Sanctuary Cities across US, GUARDIAN (Sept.
28, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/28/sanctuary-city-raid-deportation-
trump-immigration[https://perma.cc/2Q68-3R8H]; Ron Nixon & Linda Qiu, Trump’s Evolving
Words on theWall, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/politics/
trump-border-wall-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/9388-BS7H]; Full Text: Donald Trump
Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-
bid/?utm_term=.d8130b3f4481 [https://perma.cc/7T66-U2FH].
6 See, e.g., Vivian Yee, Immigrants Hide, Fearing Capture on ‘Any Corner’, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/immigrants-deportation-fe
ars.html [https://perma.cc/EFX3-TQF5].
7 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the agency within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that is responsible for enforcing federal
immigration law. See Who We Are, IMMIGR. &CUSTOMSENF’T (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.
ice.gov/about [https://perma.cc/B755-PMTQ].
8 See, e.g., JonathanBlitzer,AfteranImmigrationRaid,aCity’sStudentsVanish,NEW
YORKER (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/after-an-immigration-raid-
a-citys-students-vanish [https://perma.cc/5NLW-UJ79; John Burnett, Fearing Checkpoints,
Undocumented Immigrants Cut Off fromMedical Care, NAT’LPUB. RADIO (Nov. 3, 2017), https://
www.npr.org/2017/11/03/561883665/fearing-checkpoints-undocumented-immigrants-cut-off-from-
medical-care [https://perma.cc/E59W-5FTC]; Alexandra Hart, Houston Police Chief Alarmed by
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wave of “sanctuary” measures9 and lawsuits aimed at separating
local policies and local resources from federal enforcement
initiatives.10 The Trump administration, in turn, has focused its
officers, lawsuits, and rhetoric on these sites of resistance.11
Decreased Crime Reporting by Hispanics, TEX. STANDARD (Apr. 10, 2017), https://
www.texasstandard.org/stories/houston-police-chief-alarmed-by-decreased-crime-reporting-by-
hispanics/ [https://perma.cc/44M8-ZD5A]; Jack Healy, Stay, Hide, or Leave? Hard Choices for
Immigrants in the Heartland, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/12/us/stay-hide-or-leave-hard-choices-for-immigrants-in-the-heartland.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/J5CU-44H3]; Casey Parks, ‘Everyone is Affected.’ Immigration Raids Turn
Oregon City into Ghost Town, OR. LIVE (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-
northwest-news/index.ssf/2017/04/woodburn_taught_latinos_to_dre.html [https://perma.cc/LZ5G-
S3UE]; James Queally, Latinos Are Reporting Fewer Sexual Assaults Amid a Climate of Fear in
Immigrant Communities, LAPD Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/
lanow/la-me-ln-immigrant-crime-reporting-drops-20170321-story.html [https://perma.cc/V9WB-
3AZM; Eli Saslow, ‘Are You Alone Now?’ After Raid, Immigrant Families are Separated in the
American Heartland, WASH. POST (June 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/national/wp/2018/06/30/feature/are-you-alone-now-after-raid-immigrant-families-are-
separated-in-the-american-heartland/?utm_term=.a6ea14a27854 [https://perma.cc/8R9A-NDBX];
Catherine E. Schoichet, After ICE Raid, More Than 500 Kids Miss School, CNN (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/12/us/tennessee-immigration-raid-schools-impact/index.html
[https://perma.cc/4CRC-T8AK]. This is an easily foreseeable effect hardly limited to this
administration; in 2016, for example, a North Carolina high school senior was arrested by ICE on
hisway to school, andattendance subsequently droppedby twentypercent.MarioBoone,Durham
High School Sees Attendance Drop after Immigration Raid, WNCN (Feb. 11, 2016), https://
www.cbs17.com/news/durham-high-schools-attendance-drops-following-students-arrest
20180327003035641/1080730621 [https://perma.cc/PGJ8-G3YB].
9 The label “sanctuary policy” has no fixed meaning, taking on more political than
legal significance. Generally, the term “sanctuary” encompasses policies that restrict the
relevance of an individual’s immigration status in local law enforcement activities. This can
include “don’t ask” or “don’t police” policies addressing street-level police engagement, policies
limiting detention solely on the basis of administrative “immigration detainers [or]
administrative immigrationwarrants[,]” policies limiting disclosure of non-public jail release-
date information, and general confidentiality policies that can include immigration status
information. Christopher N. Lasch et al. Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L. REV.
1703, 1707, 1709–10, 1739, 1741, 1748, 1761 (2018) (describing the varying definitions of
“sanctuary” and categorizing types of “sanctuary” policies state and local jurisdictions have
adopted to disentangle local resources from federal immigration enforcement); Annie Lai &
Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding,
57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 545 (2017) (describing “[f]our [w]aves” of “sanctuary” policies)
(internal citations omitted); see also Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law:
A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20
LEWIS&CLARKL.REV. 165, 233–35 (2016) (examining history of “sanctuary” cities in context
of California’s “Kate’s Law”); Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities after Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENTL.REV. 13, 14
(2016) (examining state noncooperation “with executive action and nonbinding federal policy”
as “policy (re)making in immigration enforcement”).
10 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Cty. of Santa Clara v.
Trump, No. 17-CV-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017), ECF No. 1 (case consolidated with
identical case filed byCity of SanFrancisco); Complaint for Injunctive&Declaratory Relief at 1,
City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 1:17-CV-5720 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017), ECFNo. 1; Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, No. 2:17-CV-03894-MMB
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2017), ECF No. 1; Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, City of
L.A. v. Sessions, No. 2:17-CV-07215 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017), ECFNo. 1.
11 See Steven Dubois, Sessions: ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Undermine Law’s Moral Authority,
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-sessions-
sanctuary-cities-20170919-story.html [https://perma.cc/6JRY-MGMA];EricWestervelt, ICERaids
Target Cities, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/29/554424186/ice-
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President Trump’s “anti-sanctuary” campaign is really a
contest for control over local law enforcement officers.12 With 5,800
deportation and immigration enforcement agents13 available to
pursue an estimated 10.7 million immigrants living in the United
States without authorization,14 the Trump administration faces a
massive gap between its enforcement goals and its enforcement
capacity.15 Cities, counties, and states, on the other hand, employ
an estimated eight hundred thousand law enforcement officers.16
For those jurisdictions that resist the Trump administration’s
aggressive efforts, the goal is to focus local resources on local
issues.17 For the Trump administration and the jurisdictions that
support its enforcement policies, the goal is to employ local
resources as “[q]uintessential [f]orce [m]ultiplier[s]” for federal
immigration agents.18
raids-target-sanctuary-cities [https://perma.cc/PP2F-JS9U]. As states have passed their own
legislation, then-Attorney General (AG) Jeff Sessions responded with lawsuits to reflect the
administration’s immigration stance. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction &
memorandum of Law in Support at 1, United States v. California, No. 18-264 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6,
2018). ECFNo. 2-1; see alsoChristopherN.Lasch,RenditionResistance, 92N.C.L.REV. 149, 152–
53 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch,RenditionResistance].
12 Complaint at 2, United States v. California, No. 18-264 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2018);
Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (“[J]urisdictions that willfully
refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373 (sanctuary jurisdictions) are not eligible to receive Federal
grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement purposes by the Attorney General or
the Secretary.”); Jon Herskovitz, Texas Governor Signs Into Law Bill to Punish ‘Sanctuary
Cities’, REUTERS (May 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-texas-id
USKBN18402L [https://perma.cc/R8MZ-AENU]; Sanya Mansoor & Cassandra Pollock,
Everything You Need to Know About Texas’ “Sanctuary Cities” Law, TEX. TRIB. (July 6, 2017),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/08/5-things-know-about-sanctuary-cities-law/
[https://perma.cc/G8B7-5K2N]; Lasch et al., supra note 9, at 1705, 1707.
13 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF, FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 47 (2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FN3Q-3UPM].
14 See Gustavo López, Kristen Bialik, & Jynnah Radford, Key Findings about
U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/05/03/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/4VTK-7EZJ].
15 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 25, 2017) (charging
the Secretary of Homeland Security to “hire 10,000 additional immigration officers” and
to “empower State and local law enforcement agencies across the country to perform the
functions of an immigration officer in the interior of the United States”).
16 SeeDuren Banks et al.,National Sources of Law Enforcement Employment Data,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2 (Apr. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NNW-YGJA]. Data updated through 2012 and
comes from self-reporting through the UniformCrime Reporting Program (UCR). Id. at 1–2.
17 SeeCAValuesAct (SB54), ICEOUTOFCAL., http://www.iceoutofca.org/ca-values-
act-sb54.html [https://perma.cc/P8JG-FY2N].
18 See Kris Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005–2006); Kelly Memo,
supra note 1; see also WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44118, SANCTUARY
JURISDICTIONSANDCRIMINALALIENS: INBRIEF 10 (2017); Press Release, Charles Perry, Tex.
State Senator Dist. 28, Sanctuary City Ban Author Issues Statement Regarding Today’s
Hearing (June 26, 2017), https://senate.texas.gov/members/d28/press/en/p20170626a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M443-FKHB]; JazmineUlloa,Most California Sheriffs Fiercely Opposed the
‘Sanctuary State’ Law. Soon They’ll Have to Implement It, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017),
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A key means of conscription is the immigration detainer.19
Immigration detainers are administrative forms used by federal
immigration agents that ask local law enforcement officers to
notify immigration agents of the migrant’s expected date of release
from jail or prison, rearrest the migrant, and hold him or her in
local jails beyond the time justified by local criminal charges.20 If a
detainer is issued, individuals may be held even if bail is posted or
the charges are dropped.21 This article focuses on the particular
impact and legal challenges of prolonging local custody due to a
federal detainer. Detainers are not limited to people suspected of
being in the United States without authorization, but are also used
to target long-time lawful permanent residents who may have
violated immigration laws.22 Through detainers, the federal
government enlists local law enforcement officers in arresting and
detaining migrants in order to widen the net of the deportation
system far beyond what federal agents could achieve on their
own.23 President Trump’s focus on detainers in his first year in
office bore this out. In his first week as president, he promised to
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-sanctuary-state-california-sheriffs-20171112-
htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/EY54-RHNA].
19 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2018).
20 See Detainers, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/detainer-policy
[https://perma.cc/CJ4E-3ZEU]; see also ICEPolicyDirective16001.2, Investigating thePotential
U.S. Citizenship of Individuals Encountered by ICE (Dep’t Homeland Sec. 2015), https://
www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/16001.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQF3-
SY5B] [hereinafter ICEPolicyDirectiveNo. 16001.2]. Prior versions of the immigrationdetainer
distinguished between requests for notification and requests to hold the individual. The current
form requests local law enforcement officers to take both actions.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See, e.g., Who Are the Targets of ICE Detainers?, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE IMMIGR. (Feb. 20, 2013), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/
[https://perma.cc/C7T8-5HST]; ICE Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent
Residents, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE IMMIGR. (Feb. 20, 2013),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/311/ [https://perma.cc/CU9Y-HN4Q] (examining data
between FY 2008 and 2012). These data are not current because of DHS’s refusal to fulfill
standing FOIA requests on vital pieces of data. Latest ICE Data on Detainer Usage Updated
Through April 2018, TRANSACTIONALRECS. ACCESSCLEARINGHOUSE IMMIGR. (July 27, 2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/522/ [https://perma.cc/8MFU-MHVK].
23 See Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration Enforcement and the
NewCooperative Federalism, 35 YALEL.&POL’YREV. 87, 90 (2016) (discussing federal reliance
on local actors to enforce federal immigration law). When a local jurisdiction submits a subject’s
fingerprints to theFBI, they are automatically forwarded to ICE, and a local ICE field officemay
issue a detainer on this basis. See, e.g., Secure Communities, Sanctuary Cities and the Role of
ICE Detainers, TRANSACTIONALRECS. ACCESSCLEARINGHOUSE IMMIGR. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/489/ [https://perma.cc/9HX2-X7NL]. Historical information
from theTransactional RecordsAccess Clearinghouse (TRAC) indicates that detainers have not
been a large contributor to deportations as ICE frequently did not pick people up, but this
information is not available after 2011. See Alex Newman, This Is the Data We No Longer Get
About Immigration Enforcement Under the Trump Administration, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Mar. 30,
2017), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-30/data-we-no-longer-get-about-immigration-enforce
ment-under-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/TEG7-JPRQ]. Nonetheless, detainers may
well result in significant numbers of removal proceedings, and they have significant effects on
the results of state criminal proceedingsaswell as on the level of fear in immigrant communities.
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retaliate against jurisdictions that did not enforce detainers,24 and
over the course of his first two years in office, his administration
issued nearly 320,000 detainers—a seventy-five percent increase
over the last two years of the Obama administration.25
While the dispute is over federal immigration
enforcement, its resolution lies increasingly in state law.
Detainers are a mechanism for federal immigration enforcement
and thus must fit within Congress’s legislative scheme.26
Additionally, as with any law enforcement action, detainers must
be consistent with the federal Constitution.27 But because
detainers rely on arrests by state law enforcement officers the
actions of those officials must also find support in state law.28
Consequently, gaps in either federal or state authority render
detainer enforcement illegal. Conversely, for immigration
detainers to be valid, either federal or state law must
affirmatively authorize these arrests and both federal and state
law must permit their use. State law is thus a key source for local
resistance or cooperation, and states take different approaches to
detainer enforcement. For instance, Texas and California provide
a recent example with Texas passing a law to facilitate the
participation of local officers in federal immigration enforcement
and California doing the opposite.29
24 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,800 (Jan. 25, 2017) (withholding
federal funding from sanctuary jurisdictions and creating a public database that listed the
subjects of detainers these offices refused).
25 Latest Data: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detainers, TRANSACTIONAL
RECS.ACCESSCLEARINGHOUSEIMMIGR. (2017), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detain/
[https://perma.cc/U4NC-ZKAR] [hereinafter Latest Data: TRAC]. These numbers are actually
larger because the data do not include detainers from December 2017. About the Data,
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE IMMIGR. (2016), http://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/detain/about_data.html [https://perma.cc/6WY2-KYP8] [hereinafter
About the Data: TRAC]. The initial data under the Trump administration represents a marked
jump from the last two years of theObama administration, but reflects far fewer detainers than
earlier periods in the Obama administration. The Trump administration is no longer releasing
data associated with detainers. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Long v.
U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 5:17-CV-506 (N.D. N.Y. May 9, 2017) (seeking to compel
release of agency records).
26 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (providing for the use of detainers in the context of controlled
substance offenses); see infra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing discrepancy between
Congress’s statutory text and the agency’s regulation).
27 See infra Part I, notes 49—77 and accompanying text (discussing requirements
of Fourth and Tenth Amendments as applied to immigration detainers).
28 See, e.g., Cisneros v. Elder, No. 18-CV-30549, 2018 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 3388, at *2
(Dist.Ct. Colo.El PasoCty.Dec. 6, 2018); C.F.C. v.Miami-DadeCty, 349F.Supp. 3d. 1236, 1245
(S.D. Fla. 2018); Creedle v.Miami-DadeCty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Lunn
v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1146 (Mass. 2017); Esparza v. Nobles Cty, No. 53-CV-18-
751, 2018WL6263254 (Minn.Dist. Ct.Oct. 19, 2018); Valerio-Gonzales v. Jarret, 390Mont. 427
(2017): People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S.3d 518, 522 (App. Div. 2018).
29 Texas S.B. 4 prohibited local law enforcement entities from having policies that
prevented officers from asking about an individual’s immigration status and mandated
enforcement of immigration detainers.SeeTEX.GOV’TCODEANN. § 752.053(b) (West 2018). The
2019] IMMIGRATION DETAINERS, LOCAL DISCRETION 1091
Scholars and advocates have successfully explained that
federal law fails, on its own, to authorize local enforcement of civil
immigration law through immigration detainers.30 Using claims
rooted in the Tenth and the Fourth Amendments, advocates have
forced current and past administrations to refine their detainer
policies to address glaring violations of federal law.31 Though federal
claims remain, revisions in the Trump administration’s detainer
policymake their success less certain.32 State law, however, contains
multiple sources to challenge detainer enforcement.33 While courts
are looking more closely at the limitations on local immigration
enforcement contained in state law, legal scholarship is lacking.34
California’s Values Act prohibited, inter alia, “[i]nquiring into an individual’s immigration
status” or “[d]etaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.” See CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 7284.6(a)(1) (Deering 2018); see alsoS.B. 5497 § 6(8) (prohibiting local lawenforcement officers
in the State of Washington from holding individuals based on immigration detainers) http://
lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Passed%20Legislature/5497-S2.
PL.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/X9X8-XVYQ].
30 See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v.
United States, 46 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV. 629, 633–34 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch, Federal
Immigration Detainers];; Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s
Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 165 (2008)
[hereinafter Lasch,Enforcing the Limits]; Juliet Stumpf,D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from
the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM.U. L.REV. 1259, 1262 (2015); Anil Kalhan,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and
Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1106, 1006 (2013); Shareef Omar, Note, Breaking the ICE:
Reforming State and Local Government Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests, 40 SETON
HALLLEGIS. J. 159, 163 (2015) (discussing the federal claims and associated judicial opinions
that could create municipal liability for detainer enforcement); Lasch, Rendition Resistance,
supra note 11, at 150. Immigration law scholars, represented byChristopher Lasch, Professor
at Denver University, and Mark Fleming and Kate Melloy-Goettel from the National
Immigrant JusticeCenter, have filed amicus briefs in detainer challenges all over the country,
describing the lack of federal authority for local officers to enforce detainers. See, e.g., Brief
for Immigr. Legal Academics as Amici Curiae, Lunnv. Commonwealth, 477Mass. 517 (2017)
(No. SJC-12276); Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Valerio-Gonzales v. Jarret, 390Mont. 427 (2017) (CaseNo. OP 17-0659); Brief of Law
Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Sanchez Ochoa v. Campbell, 716
F. App’x 741 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-35679), 2017WL 5127850.
31 See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that
detainers can be only requests, not commands, under the Tenth Amendment regardless of
the language on the form); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-CV-00708, 2013 WL
1332158, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2013) (describing detainers as requesting warrantless
arrests); Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that custody
pursuant to a detainer constitutes a new arrest under the Fourth Amendment that must
be supported by probable cause and that probable cause is lacking when a detainer is based
on investigation of violations only).
32 See infra notes 49—77 and accompanying text (discussing recent policy revisions
and splits among courts).
33 See, e.g., Lunn v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 517, 532–37 (2017); Cisneros v.
Elder, No. 18-CV-30549, 2018 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 3388, at *2 (Dist. Ct. Colo. El Paso Cty.
Dec. 6, 2018); see also Roy v. Cty. of L.A., No. CV 12-09012-BRO (FFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 138911 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2017); People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S.3d 518
(App. Div. 2018).
34 Several authors have explored the implications of the landmark detainer
decision on state law, Lunnv.Commonwealth.See generallySeanTurley,DeathbyFifty Cuts:
Exporting Lunn v. Commonwealth to Maine and the Prospects for Waging A Frontal Assault
on the Ice Detainer System in State Courts, 70 ME. L. Rev. 235, (2018); Immigration Law—
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This article addresses that void by examining for the first
time the historical statutes and judicial decisions discussing state
and local authority to arrest people on behalf of the federal
government. In the process, it surveys the responses by states and
territories to federal pleas for local cooperation from more than a
century ago. It further reviews other historical limits placed on local
law enforcement officers arrest authority and state constitutional
protections. The article lays out a comprehensive examination of the
common confines present in state law. Together, these sources
demonstrate that arrests by state and local officers require a court-
issued document for civil violations or probable cause of criminality,
and that the right to liberty pending trial persist in state law today.
Consequently, state law often independently precludes local officers
from carrying out the arrests and detentions immigration detainers
request, even if federal law permits it.
The Trump administration has urged states to alter these
historical constraints and expand local law enforcement authority,
as Texas has.35 But this break with history is not without
significant costs. Here, the article builds on the scholarship in
immigration federalism to surface the particular harms associated
with placing discretion over enforcing immigration detainers in the
hands of state and local officers.36 The article concludes that
Local Enforcement—Massachusetts Judicial Court Holds that Local Law Enforcement Lacks
Authority to Detain Pursuant to ICE Detainers—Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E. 3d 1143
(Mass. 2017), 131 HARV. L. REV. 666 (2017).
35 Kevin Johnson,SessionsUrges Cities to Complywith ImmigrationDetainers, USA
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/27/sessions-urges
-cities-comply-immigration-detainers/99696814/ [https://perma.cc/UDA7-XLMR].
36 Scholarship on immigration federalism examines the role of state and local
governments in regulating immigration. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of
Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 788 (2008); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism,
International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361,
1361 (1999) (defining the term “immigration federalism” as “states and localities play[ing] a
role in making and implementing law and policy relating to immigration and immigrants”);
Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627
(1997);. This literature includes an adamant debate overwhether state and local governments
can and should regulate certain aspects of immigration. Compare Huyen Pham, The
ConstitutionalRightNot to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and theFederal ImmigrationPower,
74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1400-01 (2006) (raising concerns about racial profiling and abuse of
authority and proposing a balancing test for local and federal interests) and Michael J.
Wishnie,Laboratories of Bigotry?Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 521–27 (2001) (reviewing state restrictions on public
benefits for noncitizens) with Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Haden, The Growing Role for State &
Local Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 324
(2005); see also Cristina Rodriguez, Comment, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106MICH. L.REV. 567, 571–75 (2008) (describing states and localities as powerful
agents for integration and asserting the value of a power-sharing model). Though the
scholarship outlines the competing interests at play when some areas of immigration
regulation are devolved to the states, the literature does not address historical constraints on
state and local police power that limit detainer enforcement nor the dangers of pursuing
policies that would overcome these limitations.
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traditional constraints on state police power should be preserved
and enforced to limit the reach of abusive tactics, locate
responsibility and accountability for immigration enforcement
with the federal government, guard against state-by-state
variation, and protect the rights of immigrants.
Part I of this article describes the nature of the
immigration detainer and the decade of litigation that has shaped
it. This Part concludes by examining the uncertainty surrounding
future federal claims and the corresponding move to look
elsewhere for constraints on local enforcement. Part II takes stock
of the increasing stakes associated with enforcing immigration
detainers under the Trump administration throughout the
criminal justice system and through litigation over federal
attempts to force local cooperation in immigration enforcement.
Part III unearths states’ historical responses to federal requests
for their cooperation in jailing people; this Part demonstrates that
long-standing constraints on local arrest authority preclude
enforcement of immigration detainers. It concludes that these
constraints are necessary to prevent the further erosion of
immigrants’ safety and civil rights.
I. FEDERAL REQUESTS FOR LOCAL COOPERATION THROUGH
IMMIGRATIONDETAINERS
Today, detainers ask local law enforcement officers to hold
individuals an additional forty-eight hours to facilitate the
transfer of immigrants from criminal custody to immigration
custody.37 Federal immigration agents have issued detainers to
local law enforcement officers for over sixty years.38 For the past
decade, however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has faced a series of claims that detainers violate the Tenth
Amendment by commandeering state and local officers to do the
work of federal agents and that they violate the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against unreasonable seizure.39 Courts
37 ICE Policy Directive 10074.2, Issuance of Immigration Detainers by ICE
Immigration Officers (Dep’t Homeland Sec. 2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Document/2017/10074-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XVH-Z755].
38 See Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575, 576 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Rinaldi v. United
States, 484 F. Supp. 916, 916 (S.D.N.Y 1977); Matter of Lehder, 15 I. & N. Dec. 159, 159
(B.I.A. 1975) (interim decision); see also ICE Policy No. Directive 10074.2, Issuance of
Immigration Detainers by ICE Immigration Officers 1 (Dep’t Homeland Sec. 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/10074-2.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9XVH-Z755] (explaining that INS first started using the detainer form as early as 1952).
39 The Tenth Amendment sets out the principle of anti-commandeering and
prohibits the federal government from compelling states to enforce federal law. U.S.
CONST. amend. X.; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The federal
government may neither issue directives requiring the [s]tates to address particular
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have often agreed, forcing the executive branch to revise its
policies.40 This back and forth has shaped the key features of
today’s detainers and winnowed down the range of future
challenges arising out of federal law.
Historically, federal agents used immigration detainers only
to request notification of the release of an immigrant from criminal
custody.41 Detainers did not seek the ongoing detention of an
immigrant in state custody. This policy shifted with the creation of
regulations following the passage of the first and only statute to
address detainers.42 In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, which included a provision on the use of detainers as part of a
series of reforms that expanded immigration consequences for drug
crimes.43 The 1986 detainer statute allows an agent ofDHS44 to issue
a detainer for an immigrant arrested for a controlled substance
violation upon the request of the law enforcement officer.45 It further
provides that if a DHS employee issues a detainer, then federal
immigration officers “shall effectively and expeditiously take
custody of the alien.”46 Though nothing in the statute provided for
continued custody of an immigrant based on a detainer, the
problems, nor command the [s]tates’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”). The Fourth Amendment prohibits
unreasonable search and seizure and was incorporated to the states by Mapp v. Ohio.
See generallyMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Under the Fourth Amendment, a search
or seizure is reasonable if conducted with a valid warrant supported by probable cause
or falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
40 See KATE MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42690, IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 7 (2015) (discussing history of detainer litigation and policy
changes through the Obama administration); see also Immigration Detainers Litigation
Update, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR., (July 2018) https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/
resources/immig_detainer_legal_update-20180724.pdf [https://perma.cc/T777-LACL].
41 See, e.g., Prieto v. Gulch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1990); Vargas v. Swan,
854 F.2d 1028, 1035 (7th Cir. 1988) (appendix including 1983 version of the detainer form
that requests notification only of an immigrant’s projected date of release from criminal
custody); Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 1962); Dearmas v. INS,
No. 92 Civ. 8615 (PKL), 1993 WL 213031, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Slavik v. Miller, 89 F.
Supp. 575, 576 (W.D. Pa. 1950); see also Brief for Immigration Legal Academics as Amici
Curiae at 21, Lunn v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 517 (2017) (No. SJC-12276).
42 MANUEL, supra note 40, at 5–6.
43 SeeAnti-DrugAbuseActof1986,Pub.L.No.99-570,100Stat.3207,§ 1751(d) (1986).
44 The Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) located within the
Department of Justice had responsibility for immigration enforcement until the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security in 2003. Though many of the immigration statutes
continue to refer to “the Service” and “the Attorney General,” The Homeland Security Act
of 2002 provides that the Department of Homeland Security assumed the enforcement
responsibilities of the Service and the Attorney General such that statutory references to
the Service should be understood now to refer to the Department of Homeland Security.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 451(b), 116 Stat. 2135, 2196 (2002); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018).
45 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2018).
46 Id.
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implementing regulation, created in 1988, did.47 That regulation
extends the use of detainers beyond drug crimes, and states that
once a detainer is filed, the law enforcement agency “shall maintain
custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of
custody by the Department.”48
More than a decade of detainer litigation based on the
Fourth and Tenth Amendments has generated the key
characteristics of today’s immigration detainer policy. Courts
recognize detainers as requests, not commands, to local officials.49
Detainers call for a maximum of forty-eight hours of additional
detention.50 Custody pursuant to a detainer constitutes an arrest.51
The immigration arrest must be supported by probable cause of
removability.52 Detainers require warrants or probable cause of
47 Rule ImplementingAmendments fromAnti-DrugAbuseAct and IRCAof 1986, 53
Fed. Reg. 9281, 9281-84 (Mar. 22, 1988). Scholars have highlighted this discrepancy and argued
that the regulation is ultra vires as a result. See Lasch, Enforcing the Limits, supra note 30, at
191–93; Lasch,Federal ImmigrationDetainers, supranote 30, at 681–95.A federal district court
in California reviewed a challenge to DHS’s detainer regulations and concluded that they are a
reasonable application of the authority delegated to the agency byCongress. Comm. for Immigr.
Rights of Sonoma Cty. v. Sonoma Cty., 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1186, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009). No
other district courts or U.S. courts of appeals has ruled on the issue.
48 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2018). The regulation further makes clear that DHS will
not pay for the costs associated with this extended detention. Id. § 287.7(e).
49 Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745F.3d634, 645 (3dCir. 2014). By the time theThirdCircuit
considered whether detainers were a request or a command, the Department of Homeland
Security had revised its detainer form to change the language from requiring that local law
enforcement maintain custody to requesting this. Id. at 642; see also Understanding
Immigration Detainers: An Overview for State Defense Counsel, U.S.DEP’TOFHOMELANDSEC.,
(Mar. 2011), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/pdfs/practitioners/practice_advisories/crim/
2011_may_understand-detainers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LQS-2AKN] (AppendixB-Sample I-247
Immigration Detainer Forms); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-CV-02317,
2014WL 1414305, at *7 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
50 Beginning in 2008, a series of lawsuits were filed challenging detention that far
exceeded the forty-eight-hour period referenced in the form and regulation. Issue Brief:
Immigration Detainers & Local Discretion, AM. CIV. LIB. UNION N. CAL. 1, 5-7 (Apr. 2011),
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/detainers_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BA6-7
CPA]. In 2011, DHS revised the form to emphasize that custody should not exceed forty-eight
hours beyond the time the person would otherwise be released. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action, Form I-247 (rev’d June 2011), on file with
author. The detention request exempted Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays from that forty-
eight hour period until the Obama administration’s 2015 revisions.U.S.DEP’TOFHOMELAND
SEC., IMMIGRATION DETAINER-REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY ACTION DHS FORM I-247D (rev’d
May 2015), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/I-247D.PDF
[https://perma.cc/8NTG-2HCD].
51 Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Ochoa v.
Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1247ç48 (E.D. Wash. 2017).
52 Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015).
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escape.53 Finally, they enforce civil, not criminal, violations of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).54
The Trump administration issued a new detainer policy in
March 2017 that reflects these core features.55 One of the policy’s
explicit goals was that “ICE’s [law enforcement agency] partners
may honor detainers.”56 It eliminated the three separate detainer
forms created by the Obama administration and created a single
new detainer form.57 The new form asserts that ICE agents have
probable cause that the person is removable and requires the
detainer to be accompanied by either an administrative warrant
of arrest or an administrative warrant of removal/deportation.58
It further instructs ICE officers to assume custody as closely as
possible to the time at which the person would otherwise be
released. The form also states that a detainer should be cancelled
if officers cannot assume custody within forty-eight hours of that
time.59 The contents of the detainer form require “probable cause”
of removability and request ongoing detention for up to forty-eight
hours without exceptions for weekends and holidays.60 The new
53 Morenov.Napolitano, 213F.Supp. 3d999, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2016)(advocates brought
a class action challenging all detainers issued by ICE’s Chicago field office aimed at the
warrantless arrests detainers effected); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-CV-00708, 2013
WL 1332158, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2013) (describing detainers as requesting warrantless
arrests). Congress authorized warrantless arrests by ICE agents but only if agents have a
“reason to believe that the [person] . . . is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for
his arrest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2018). Courts have interpreted the statute’s phrase “reason to
believe” to equate to probable cause in order to meet the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
standard. Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L. J. 1563, 1608, 1608 n.229
(2010). The court inMoreno concluded that ICE agents lacked probable cause that the subjects
of detainers were likely to escape. Class members were already in custody and thus unlikely to
escape before a warrant could be obtained. ICE could not rely on a categorical assessment of
flight risk for the class either.Moreno, 213F. Supp. 3d at 1005. Based on this determination, the
district court ruled that detainers that were not accompanied by an administrative warrant or
a charging document exceeded their statutory authority. Id. at 1002, 1009 (certifying the class
as individuals subject to a detainer that was not accompanied by awarrant of arrest, warrant of
deportation, or charging document used to initiate removal proceedings). The effect of the ruling
was to invalidate nearly all detainers lodged in Illinois, Indiana,Wisconsin,Missouri, Kentucky,
andKansas.SeeEnforcement andRemovalOperationsFieldOffices, IMMIGR.&CUSTOMSENF’T
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/contact/ero [https://perma.cc/BA2S-H8M4](listing the area of
responsibility of the Chicago Field Office).
54 See Lunn v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 517, 518 (2017); Cisneros v. Elder, No.
18-CV-30549, 2018Colo. Dist. LEXIS 3388, at *22 (El PasoCty. Dec. 6, 2018); see alsoArizona
v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (“Removal is a civil, not criminal matter”).
55 ICE Policy No. 10074.2, supra note 37, at 1 (citing Moreno v. Napolitano, 213
F. Supp. 3d 999, as supporting authority).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2.
59 Id. at 3.
60 Id. at 3–4. The administrativewarrant of arrest accompanying the detainer form
under this policy, however, asserts probable cause of removability based only on the existence
of a charging document or pending proceedings. A charging document is not reviewed by an
immigration judge or, in many cases, even an ICE attorney to determine its validity before it
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form also eliminates the choice between requesting notification of
release ormaintaining detention and instead asks law enforcement
agencies to do both.61 The policy concludes that any detainers
declined by law enforcement agencies should be documented in
ICE’s database.62
This evolution of the administration’s detainer policy
means that the range of federal claims has narrowed. Fourth
Amendment challenges remain due to the nature of administrative
immigration warrants and the civil violations they enforce.63 By
regulation, an immigration warrant of arrest can be issued only by
designated federal officials after amandated training course64 if the
agent has reason to believe that the person named is in the United
States illegally.65 Unlike in the criminal context, a neutral
magistrate does not review this statement of probable cause and
thesewarrants are not issued by judicial officers.66Nor do detainers
indicate commission of a crime.
Challenges rooted in the scope of the authorizing statute
and regulations also remain. Immigration arrests are governed
by a detailed regulatory scheme, which does not include state and
local law enforcement officers.67 Only designated immigration
agents are authorized to “execute warrants of arrest for
administrative immigration violations.”68 These designated
officers must also complete a basic training course in immigration
law enforcement before they canmake civil arrests.69 Accordingly,
administrative arrest warrants and administrative warrants of
removal are directed only to those officers identified in the federal
regulations.70Attaching an administrative warrant to an
is filed in the immigration court and thus the existence of a charging document or a pending
proceeding does not necessarily equate to probable cause of removability.
61 DEP’T OFHOMELANDSEC., IMMIGRATIONDETAINER –NOTICE OFACTION, FORM I-
247A (Mar. 2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/I-247A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P42J-K3ZJ].
62 ICE Policy No. 10074.2, supra note 37, at 5.
63 See, e.g., Lena Graber & Ann Benson, Immigration Enforcement Authority for
Local Law Enforcement Agents, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR. (2014), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/
default/files/resources/lea_immig_faqs_20150318.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7TQ-LDU3].
64 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.5(e), 236.1(b)(1) (2018); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012 &
Supp. V 2018).
65 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2) (2018).
66 Coolidge v. NewHampshire, 403U.S. 443, 553 (1971) (finding awarrant issued by
the AttorneyGeneral to be invalid because he was not a neutralmagistrate); Johnson v. United
States, 333U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (the Fourth Amendment’s requirement for reasonablenessmeans
that “inferences [must] be drawn by a neutral and detachedmagistrate instead of being judged
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).
67 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407–08 (“The federal statutory structure
instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process.”).
68 8 C.F.R § 287.5(e)(3) (2018); accord, 8 C.F.R. 236.1(b)(1) (2018).
69 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.5(c)(1), (e)(3), 287.1(g) (2018) (defining the required training).
70 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FORM I-200:
WARRANT FOR ARREST OF ALIEN (2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
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immigration detainer therefore does not clearly convey additional
federal enforcement authority to local officers. Instead,
immigration advocates argue that the regulatory structure
precludes arrests by local officials notwithstanding the presence
of an administrative arrest warrant because that warrant can
only be executed by certain federal officials.
Courts are split, however, on the Fourth Amendment and
regulatory claims. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana invalidated a state law that would
have authorized local officers to arrest immigrants based on
detainers alone.71 The court held that the law was invalid under
the Fourth Amendment because it authorized officers to perform
warrantless arrests for violations that are not crimes.72 Though an
administrative warrant must now accompany a detainer, that
change does not alter the civil nature of the violations underlying
detainers nor address the significant differences between criminal
and administrative warrants. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit similarly invalidated the arrest by local
officers of a woman waiting to start her shift at work on the basis
of an immigration warrant.73 The court reasoned that the lack of
probable cause of criminality or specific authorization for the police
officers to act as immigration agents meant that the arrests lacked
any lawful basis.74 TheUnited States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, however, overruled two district court decisions that had
invalidated detainers for lack of criminal probable cause.75 Other
courts have rejected similar Fourth Amendment claims.76
Document/2017/I-200_SAMPLE.PDF [https://perma.cc/5QQJ-Y5W3] [hereinafter Form I-
200]; U.S. DEP’T OFHOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FORM I-205: WARRANT OF
REMOVAL/DEPORTATION, https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/I-
205_SAMPLE.PDF [https://perma.cc/PZ9W-A27G] [hereinafterForm I-205]; see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.2(b) (2018).
71 Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-CV-00708, 2013 WL 1332158, at *10–11
(S.D. Ind.Mar. 28, 2013).
72 Id. at *10–11.
73 See Santos v. Frederick Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 465–66 (4th Cir.
2013) (finding that a local arrest based on only civil immigration warrant, absent federal
direction or authorization, violated the Fourth Amendment); see alsoPeople ex rel.Swenson
v. Ponte, 46 Misc. 3d 273, 278 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (“There is no allegation that the
Department has actually obtained a removal order and, if in fact they had, there is still no
authority for a local correction commissioner to detain someone based upon a civil
determination, as immigration removal orders are civil, not criminal, in nature.”).
74 Santos, 725 F.3d at 465–66.
75 City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 188 n.22 (5th Cir. 2018) (abrogating
Mercado v. Dallas Cty., 229 F. Supp. 3d 501, 512–13 (W.D. Tex. 2017) and Santoyo v.
United States, No. 5:16-CV-885, 2017 WL 2896021 (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2017)).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Robles, No. CR-17-0730-TUC-CKJ (JR), 2017
WL 6558595, *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2017) (finding that probable cause of removability based
on a prior removal order was sufficient under the Fourth Amendment to support the
enforcement of a detainer by the Pima County Sheriff’s Department in Arizona), appeal
docketed, No. 18-10477 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2018); see also Orellana v. Nobles Cty., 230 F.
2019] IMMIGRATION DETAINERS, LOCAL DISCRETION 1099
Likewise, claims that state officials lack authority to enforce
detainers because they are not designated in the statutory and
regulatory scheme have been met with mixed success.77
None of these disputes, however, addresses the parallel
issue of whether civil immigration arrests by state and local officers
are permitted under that state’s law. In light of this vulnerability,
the Trump administration has taken an additional step to protect
the enforceability of immigration detainers in the courts and with
local law enforcement agencies. In Florida, DHS is piloting a policy
proposed by a Florida county sheriff to the National Sheriff’s
Association andMajor County Sheriffs of America.78 The pilot adds
basic agreements betweenDHS and local jails to house immigrants
on a short-term basis and includes a formal Order to Detain with
the detainer and administrative warrant.79 The theory is that
sheriffs are never effecting an immigration arrest but rather acting
under the service agreement to detain the person such that ICE
becomes the custodian of the inmate when the detainer,
administrative arrest warrant, and Order to Detain are filed.80
Supp. 3d 934, 945 (D. Minn. 2017) (finding the reasons underlying the detainer to provide
sufficient probable cause to support the enforcement of a detainer by county sheriff but
concluding that the absence of likelihood of flight did not allow for a warrantless arrest);
Mendoza v. Osterberg, No. 8:13-CV-65, 2016 WL 6238605, at *13 (D. Neb. Mar. 3, 2016)
(finding detainer based on probable cause of removability to be sufficient under the Fourth
Amendment); Smith v. State, 719 So. 2d 1018, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Chery v.
Sheriff of Nassau Cty, No. 8100/15, 2015 WL 13665005, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 3, 2015);
People v. Xirum, 45 Misc. 3d 785, 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
77 See, e.g., Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (finding that
detention by state officers for immigration violations, absent an express agreement,
conflicts with Congress’s regulatory scheme) later reversed following the Fifth Circuit’s
ruling City of El Cenizo, Abriq v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 333 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787
(M.D. Tenn. 2018) appeal dismissed sub nom. Abriq v. Hall, No. 18-6124, 2019 WL
319826 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 2019). Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 296 F.
Supp. 3d 959, 969–70 (S.D. Ind. 2017) with United States v. Gomez-Robles, No. CR-17-
0730-TUC-CKJ (JR), 2017 WL 6558595, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2017), appeal docketed,
No. 18-10477 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2018) (rejecting arguments that local officials did not
have authority to make immigration arrests under the regulatory structure and
reasoning that the detainer regulations provide that authority).
78 Memorandum from Sheriff Bob Gaultieri, Pinellas County, Fla., to Sheriff
Greg Champagne, President, Nat’l Sheriffs’ Ass’n, and Sheriff Sandra Hutchens,
President, Major Cty. Sheriffs of Am. On Immigration Detainer Issues and Solution
(June 22, 2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gaultieri Memo] (describing the
ongoing concerns regarding the limited nature of the administrative warrants and the
Fourth Amendment concerns surrounding local arrests for civil violations); Sheriffs from
17 Florida Counties Unveil Plan to Work Together with Immigration Officials, NBC
MIAMI (Jan. 18, 2018, 7:24 AM), https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/Sheriffs-From-
17-Florida-Counties-Unveil-Plan-to-Work-Together-With-Immigration-Officials—
469904193.html [https://perma.cc/MD5Z-LFRW].
79 Sheriffs from 17 Florida Counties Unveil Plan to Work Together with
Immigration Officials, supra note 78.
80 Id.; see also Gaultieri Memo, supra note 78, at 3; Caitlin Dickerson, Trump
Administration Moves to Expand Deportation Dragnet to Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/us/sheriffs-immigration-jails.html [https://
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Opponents counter that these payment agreements and processing
orders are insufficient to make the ICE agent, rather than the local
sheriff, the person performing the arrest.81 This latest policy is
being challenged in court as well.82
The next Part describes why the current contests over
immigration detainers matter so much to so many. The article then
examines laws common to many states that provide independent
prohibitions on local detainer enforcement.
II. THEGROWING STAKES OF THEDETAINER DEBATE
The consequences flowing from detainer requests are
wide-reaching and severe. For individuals, detainers adversely
affect the outcomes of criminal proceedings. They result in
longer pre-trial detention, convictions for more serious crimes,
and imposition of stiffer sentences. For communities, they erode
trust in law enforcement, reduce crime reporting, and increase
the likelihood of racial profiling.
The direct effects detainers have on criminal justice
outcomes begin with the extended pre-trial detention they provoke.
Local officials often refuse to accept bond in the criminal proceeding
for someone subject to an immigration detainer and thus require
the person to remain detained pending the disposition of his or her
criminal case.83 According to one study, individuals subject to
immigration detainers were in custody three times longer than
other similarly situated inmates.84 For instance, Enrique Uroza, a
college student in Utah, posted bail ten minutes after it was set by
the Utah criminal court.85 Nonetheless, county officials held him
for another thirty-nine days based on an immigration detainer
before a state court ordered his immediate release.86 Remaining in
perma.cc/EK5F-KMMY] (describing the policy’s goal of protecting sheriffs from Fourth
Amendment claims).
81 See, e.g., FAQ on ICE’s New “Enforcement Partnerships” in Florida, AM. CIV. LIB.
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/fact-sheet/faq-ices-new-enforcement-partnerships-florida [https://
perma.cc/94ZG-V3T9] (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).
82 See Complaint at 2–3, Brown v. Ramsay, No. 4:18-CV-10279-KMM, (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 3, 2018), 2018 WL 6340578.
83 See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 213 (1st Cir. 2015); Ochoa v.
Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1251–52 (E.D. Wash. 2017), appeal dismissed as moot sub
nom. Sanchez-Ochoa v. Campbell, 716F. App’x 741 (9thCir. 2018); First AmendedComplaint
at 6, Padilla-Arredondo v. Canyon Cty., No. 1:18-CV-00025-EJL-CWD (D. Idaho Apr. 23,
2018), ECF No. 14.
84 ANDREA GUTTIN, AMER. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, 1, 12 (2010), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/Criminal_Alien_Program_
021710.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV54-EFAM].
85 Uroza v. Salt Lake County, No. 2:11-CV-713-DAK, 2014 WL 4457300, at *1
(D. Utah Sept. 10, 2014).
86 Id. at *1–2.
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pretrial custody, in turn, increases the likelihood of conviction87 by
more than ten percent and increases the severity of the sentence
two- to three-fold.88 An immigration detainer can also significantly
affect the conditions of criminal custody by limiting the availability
of work opportunities while in jail, participation in rehabilitative
programs, and eligibility for work release.89
Immigration detainers can also lead to criminal convictions
that could otherwise be avoided through diversion programs. These
programs provide rehabilitation services in return for dismissal of
the criminal charge upon completion, but they generally require
non-custodial settings.90Adetainer precludes eligibility for diversion
programs because it signals that upon release of the criminal charge
the person will be transferred directly into immigration custody and
thus not able to complete the conditions of the diversion program.91
For example, police arrested a man in Miami-Dade County for
driving with a suspended license.92 ICE lodged a detainer on him.93
As a result, the man was not placed in a diversion program that
would have avoided a conviction altogether and was not released
from county jail after posting his bail of two dollars.94 Instead, hewas
87 WillDobbie et al.,TheEffects of Pre-TrialDetention onConviction, FutureCrime,
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 203
(2018), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20161503 [https://perma.cc/YP8V-G3
HU] (stating that individuals released from detention pretrial were 14% less likely to be
convicted of a crime).
88 CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE
IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES, 1, 11 (2013), http://www.
arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Z689-8XSS].
89 These consequences are not mandated by the detainer but are a common effect
in how they are enforced.See, e.g., Lucatero v. Haynes, No. 1:14-CV-255, 2014WL 6387560,
at *1 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2014); Comm. on Criminal Justice Operations, Immigration
Detainers Need Not Bar Access to Jail Diversion Programs, N.Y.C. BAR 1, 3 (June 2009),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/NYCBA_Immigration%20Detainers_Report_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2BN5-KZPS].
90 For example, in Broward County, Florida, the Domestic Violence Misdemeanor
Program is non-custodial, specifying that compliance requires attendance of a 26-week
Batterer’s Intervention Program and that any other arrest or charge for any criminal offense
will terminate participation. Domestic Violence Misdemeanor Diversion Program, OFFICE OF
THE STATE ATTORNEY, SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, http://www.sao17.state.fl.us/assets/
dvmdp.pdf [https://perma.cc/EE4J-Q7C5]. In Minnesota, Pretrial Diversion Programs are
statutorily required in counties participating in the state’sCommunityCorrectionsAct, with the
goal of providing “eligible offenders with an alternative to confinement and a criminal
conviction[.]” MINN. STAT. § 401.065 (2019); see also Pretrial Diversion, NAT’LCONF. ST. LEGIS.
(Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-diversion.aspx
[https://perma.cc/99LF-792H].
91 Comm. on Criminal Justice Operations, supra note 89; see also Complaint at
9, Sanchez Ochoa v. Campbell, No. 17-CV-03124 (E.D. Wash. July 17, 2017), ECF No. 1.
92 Complaint at 4, 14-15, C.F.C. et al. v. Miami-Dade Cty., No. 18-CV-22956
(S.D. Fla. July 20, 2018), ECF No. 1.
93 Id. at 14–15.
94 Id.
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held for more than five weeks solely on the immigration detainer.95
Due to his ongoing detention, he had to close his landscaping
business and fire his dozen employees.96
Given the immigration consequences that flow from many
criminal convictions, detainers can have the perverse effect of
eliminating legal avenues to immigration that would have been
available absent that conviction. In Hennepin County, Minnesota,
for example, first-time offenders for low-level drug possession
charges can participate in chemical-dependency assessments,
community service, and regular check-ins to prove rehabilitation
and avoid a drug conviction.97 Drug convictions, in turn, trigger
deportability and mandatory immigration detention.98 Hennepin
County public defenders, however, cannot make use of this
alternative to conviction for clients who are subject to immigration
detainers because these individuals will not be released to a
community setting as the program requires.
Ms. Anotich, for example, the mother of a young child and
the victim of trafficking, was unable to avoid a conviction for drug
possession through the county’s diversion program, even though
citizen defendants charged with the same crime could. Instead, she
pled guilty to the charge to limit her time away from her daughter
and moved to immigration court where she had to fight her
removal based on the very drug conviction the detainer caused.99
The costs to communities of detainer enforcement are
significant as well. Numerous studies show that local
immigration enforcement coincides with race-based policing. In
Irving, Texas, the use of detainers motivated local law
enforcement officers to make race-based arrests so that ICE can
screen individuals for deportability.100 Those studies have also
documented the profound effect those practices have on the
relationship between local law enforcement and immigrant
95 Id.
96 Id. at 14.
97 See Adult Diversion, HENNEPIN CTY. ATTY’S OFF. (2019), https://www.
hennepinattorney.org/about/adult-diversion/adult-diversion [https://perma.cc/752R-2537].
98 8U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2008) (providing that a conviction for any controlled
substance offense of any state is a ground of removal, with a limited exception for some
marijuana-related offenses); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (1996) (subjecting convictions
for controlled substance offenses to mandatory immigration detention).
99 Email fromKathyMoccio, Visiting Clinical Professor, University ofMinnesota
School of Law, to Kate Evans, Associate Professor of Law & Immigration Clinic Director,
University of Idaho College of Law (DATE) (on file with author).
100 Trevor Gardner & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the ICE
Criminal Alien Program, WARREN INST. 1, 4 (2009), https://www.motherjones.com/files/
policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW3Y-YDQ3].
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communities, resulting in lower rates of reporting crime and
growing reluctance to participate in prosecution.101
Consider the case of Mr. Garcia, who saw a routine traffic
stop turn into a deportation proceeding even though no criminal
charges were ever filed.102 A deputy sheriff in Idaho stopped Mr.
Garcia for a “bad axel” and arrested him for driving without a
license, something he could not obtain in Idaho based on his
unauthorized status.103 The arresting officer then contacted ICE
and ICE issued a detainer for him.104 The state criminal charge
for driving without a license was never filed; instead, Mr. Garcia
was transferred to immigration detention and placed in removal
proceedings.105 The experience of Mr. Garcia illustrates how
immigration detainers invite racial profiling. The detainer
allowed the sheriff’s deputy to convert a traffic stop into
immigration detention and a lengthy removal proceeding. ForMr.
Garcia, the policy of Idaho sheriffs to enforce detainers appears to
have motivated a pretextual stop given that no state criminal
charges were ever pursued.
Detainers also amplify the impact of racial bias. A national
study of county sheriffs published in 2017 shows that the size of
the Latinx population in the sheriff’s jurisdiction is associated
101 See, e.g., AMADA ARMENTA, PROTECT, SERVE, AND DEPORT: THE RISE OF
POLICING AS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 31 (2017); KATHERINE BECKETT & HEATHER
EVANS, UNIV. WASH. IMMIGRATION DETAINER REQUESTS IN KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON:
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES, i (Mar. 26, 2013), http://nwirp.org/documents/pressreleases/
BeckettXEvans_ICE_Detainer_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/584D-4356]; see also
RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF
287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, 28 (2011), https://www.migration
policy.org/sites/default/files/publications/287g-divergence.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF78-SXFH];
CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., A PROGRAM IN FLUX, NEW PRIORITIES
AND IMPLEMENTATIONCHALLENGES FOR 287(G) 7–8 (2010), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/publications/287g-March2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JEY-JRSU] (reporting
that one sheriff used the 287(g) agreement with his county to identify and arrest large
numbers of immigrants with no criminal activity);; NIK THEODORE, DEP’T OF URBAN
PLANNING AND POL’Y, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS
OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, 5ç6 (2013), http://
www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/TPW2-6D4R] (“Survey results indicate that the greater involvement of
police in immigration enforcement has significantly heightened the fears many Latinos have
of the police . . . exacerbating their mistrust of law enforcement authorities.”); Queally, supra
note 8 (“Los Angeles Police Chief Charlie Beck said Tuesday that reports of sexual assault
and domestic violence made by the city’s Latino residents have plummeted this year amid
concerns that immigrants in the country illegally could risk deportation by interacting with
police or testifying in court.”).
102 See I-213 SUBJECT ID: 355703651, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (May 19,
2016) (on file with the author). The DHS form details the nature of the police encounter
and ICE’s involvement. The individual’s name has been changed to protect his identity.
103 IDAHOCODE § 49-303(14) (2019) (providing that individuals “not lawfully present
in the United States” may not be licensed).
104 Id.
105 Id.
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with the degree of bias toward immigration: the larger the Latinx
population in the county, the more negative the sheriff’s views.106
The negative views persisted regardless of the growth rate of the
immigrant population or their immigration status.107 Further, the
more negative the attitude of the sheriff, the more frequently
their office checks the immigration status of people who are
stopped for traffic violations or interact with the office as
witnesses to crime.108 Moreover, the views of the county’s
residents with respect to immigration policy and enforcement did
notmediate the sheriff’s practices.109Rather, the sheriff’s personal
attitude toward immigration was the primary factor affecting the
office’s immigration enforcement actions.110 The study’s findings
mean that the larger the Latinx population in a county, the more
likely it is that the sheriff’s office will check immigration status
during any interaction, regardless of the political preferences of
the electorate. Immigration detainers then link bias-driven status
checks to deportation proceedings.
The Trump administration has expanded the number of
people experiencing the consequences of detainers at both the
individual and community levels. Though immigration officials have
issued detainers for the past sixty years, the practice did not become
widespread until 2007. That year, the use of detainers jumped by
over four hundred percent from fifteen thousand to more than
seventy-six thousand.111 This increase coincided with the
development of Secure Communities, which automatically routes
the results of a fingerprint check in the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) database upon arrest by local law enforcement
through ICE’s databases to identify immigration violations.112 The
new screening mechanism meant that ICE could issue a flood of
detainers with little effort or review.113 As a result, the number of
detainers issued continued to increase through 2011 when federal
106 Emily M. Farris & Mirya R. Holman, All Politics is Local? County Sheriffs
and Localized Policies of Immigration Enforcement, 70 POL. RES. Q. 142, 149 (2017).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 151.
109 Id. at 152.
110 Id.
111 See Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
112 See Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015);
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1084, 1095–1101 (2004) (describing Department of Justice’s attempts to add
many different types of immigration information into its main criminal database, the
National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) and arguing that federal statutes do not
allow this); Secure Communities: Overview, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.
gov/secure-communities [https://perma.cc/MLA3-8K28].
113 See Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers, supra note 30, at 677 (discussing
the effect of linking FBI fingerprint checks with DHS databases to allow rapid increase in
use of detainers).
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officials filed nearly 310,000 of them for immigrants across the
country.114 The rate then declined throughout the remainder of the
Obama administration as President Obama established a priority
enforcement system that made certain criminal or immigration
history a prerequisite for a detainer.115 The use of detainers reversed
course with the inauguration of President Trump.116 During its first
year, the Trump administration issued over 142,000 detainers—an
increase of sixty-six percent over the prior fiscal year.117
States and localities assume the costs of federal immigration
policy when they enforce detainers. These costs can be staggering:
Texas counties, for example, spent $72 million in 2017 enforcing
immigration detainers as mandated by the new state law.118 A 2012
report estimated that Colorado paid $13 million per year to enforce
federal immigration laws.119 The costs to Miami-Dade County in
2017 topped $12 million.120 These numbers do not account for the
damages that must be paid by counties for wrongful arrests in
enforcing detainers.121 States and localities must account for these
costs when enacting policies to enforce detainers.
114 Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25. The number of detainers is aggregated
by fiscal year, which begins on October 1 and ends on September 30 so that the data for
2011 cover detainers issued between October 1, 2010 and September 30, 2011. See About
the Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
115 See Further Decrease in Detainer Use, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Aug. 28, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/402/ [https://perma.cc/
A2DN-6DCB] [hereinafterFurtherDecrease inDetainerUse, TRAC]; see also supra notes 24–25
and accompanying text.
116 See Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25; see also Further Decrease in Detainer
Use, TRAC, supra note 115.
117 Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25. This increase is actually an underestimate in
the use of detainers under Trump because it includes four months of the Obama
administration in the 2017 fiscal year (Oct. 2016–Jan. 2017). The Trump administration is
now refusing to release data on detainers sought by TRAC through FOIA requests.
118 Gus Bova, ICE Issues More Detainers in Texas, Withholds Crucial Data, TEX.
OBSERVER (May 7, 2018, 1:05 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/ice-issues-more-detainers-
in-texas-withholds-crucial-data/ [https://perma.cc/QU5H-PN7T].
119 KATHYA.WHITE&LUCYDWIGHT, COLO. FISCAL INST.,MISPLACEDPRIORITIES:
SB90 & THE COSTS TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1, 11 (2012), https://www.coloradofiscal.org/
wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2013-3-1-v.2-SB90-Misplaced-Priorities-Ed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GMT9-Z2PA].
120 Jerry Iannelli, Miami-Dade Blew $12.5 Million Holding ICE Detainees in 2017,
Rights Groups Say, MIAMINEW TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/
miami-dade-ice-detainers-cost-125-million-in-2017-10058788 [https://perma.cc/4FEX-EWVM].
121 See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. R.I.), aff’d on appeal,
793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 12-02317, 2014 WL
1414305, at *10 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-6815, 2012WL 1080020,
at *10, *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (unpub.), rev’d on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir.
2014); Harvey v. City of New York, 07 Civ. 0343 (NG) (LB) (E.D.N.Y.) ($145,000 settlement
for damages upon being held for a month on an expired detainer); Arroyo v. Spokane Cty.
Sheriff’s Office, Claim No. 10-0046 (June 2010) ($35,000 settlement from county for
damages upon being held for 20 days on immigration detainer);Galarza, 2012WL 1080020
($95,000.00 settlement for wrongful imprisonment of U.S. citizen).
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On the other hand, the Trump administration has raised the
stakes for states, counties, and local law enforcement agencies that
refuse to enforce detainers by threatening them with sanctions and
lawsuits. President Trump took his first shot across the bow of
“sanctuary jurisdictions” during his first week in office.122 Executive
Order 13,768 announced that “sanctuary jurisdictions” would be
ineligible to receive federal grants and that the Attorney General
would take enforcement actions against any entity “which has in
effect a statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the
enforcement of Federal law.”123 This included refusals to enforce
detainers.124 President Trump called the order “a weapon” against
jurisdictions that do not cooperate with ICE;125 additionally, then-
Attorney General Jeff Sessions initially warned these jurisdictions
that he would withhold grants, bar future grants, and claw back
money from previous awards.126
Further, the Trump administration has engaged in a public
opinion campaign to vilify jurisdictions that do not enforce
detainers and has threatened raids of their residents if they do not
capitulate. For example, one section of the Executive Order, which
is not enjoined, requires public reporting of any criminal charge
against an immigrant who had been subject to a detainer that a
local enforcement agency declined to enforce.127 As part of this
122 See Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
123 Id.
124 Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-
sanctuary-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/K8SQ-XB4R].
125 The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News Broadcast, Feb. 5, 2017), transcribed in
President Trump Talks Travel Ban, Putin, Mexico; Could Trump Pull Federal Funds from
California?; Trump Says There Could Be Tax, CNN (Feb. 5. 2017, 6:00 PM), http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1702/05/cnr.05.html [https://perma.cc/99DX-LT5Q].
126 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions (Mar. 27,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-
sanctuary-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/K8SQ-XB4R]. Litigation in San Francisco, Santa
Clara, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles has resulted in preliminary or permanent
injunctions against the order’s enforcement, but the litigation continues. See City of S. F.
v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming permanent injunction halting
implementation of § 9(a) of the January 25 EO, but vacating nationwide scope and
remanding for additional fact-finding for scope of injunction); City of Chi. v. Sessions, 321
F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2018) (entering permanent injunction with nationwide
scope) appeal dismissed, Order, City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-5720 (7th Cir. Oct.
22, 2018) (dismissing appeal of permanent injunction until nationwide scope narrowed and
clarified); City of Phila. v. Sessions, No. 17-3894, slip op. at 84–90 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2018)
(entering declaratory judgment and mandamus); City of L.A. v. Sessions, No. 2:18-CV-
07347 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2019) (order granting partial summary judgment and
permanently enjoining imposing conditions on funding programs).
127 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,801 (Jan. 25, 2017). The “Declined
Detainer Outcome Report” mandated by the Executive Order was beset by inaccuracies and has
beensuspended.SeeNikitaBiryukov, ICESuspendsWeekly ‘SanctuaryCity’ReportOverAccuracy
Concerns, NBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017, 5:07 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ice-
suspends-weekly-sanctuary-city-report-over-accuracy-concerns-n745246 [https://perma.cc/JD8X-
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reporting requirement, DHS publishes a list of jurisdictions with
policies it has determined restrict cooperation with ICE.128
Likewise, President Trump stated on national television that
sanctuary cities “breed crime” and went on to say, “If we have to
we’ll defund, we give tremendous amounts of money to
California . . . California in many ways is out of control.”129
However, study after study demonstrate that immigration does not
“breed crime” but in fact correlates to reductions in crime.130 The
rhetoric influences public opinion nonetheless.131
Though the cities, counties, and states trying to separate local
law enforcement resources from federal immigration enforcement
have been successful so far,132 the continuing legal battles have raised
the financial and political stakes of these policies substantially. For
immigrants, their families, and their communities, eliminating local
detainer enforcement is necessary to ensure fairness in criminal
4EK3]; Declined Detainer Outcome Report: Overview, IMMIGR. &CUSTOMSENF’T (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.ice.gov/declined-detainer-outcome-report#tab0 [https://perma.cc/826R-XTPF].
128 See ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS, WEEKLY DECLINED DETAINER
OUTCOMEREPORTFORRECORDEDDECLINEDDETAINERS JAN. 8–FEB. 3, 2017, U.S. CUSTOMS
& IMMIGR. ENF’T (2017), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ddor/ddor2017_01-28to02-03.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2H6P-7APW];DHSReleases U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Declined
Detainer Outcome Report, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.
ice.gov/news/releases/dhs-releases-us-immigration-and-customs-enforcement-declined-
detainer-outcome-report [https://perma.cc/DV73-TFU8]. Because of pervasive errors in the
report, its publication has been temporarily suspended.
129 Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(omission in original).
130 See generally Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, et al., The Politics of Refuge:
Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration, 55 URB. AFF. REV. 3 (2017);
see also Anna Flagg, The Myth of the Criminal Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/30/upshot/crime-immigration-myth.html
[https://perma.cc/QDC8-2XAB]; Mike Males, Refuting Fear: Immigration, Youth, and
California’s Stunning Declines in Crime and Violence, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. J. 1, 1
(2017), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/refuting_fear_-_immigration_youth_
and_californias_stunning_declines_in_crime_and_violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/JDD4-
M6PC]; Tom K. Wong, Sanctuary Cities Don’t ‘Breed Crime.’ They Encourage People to
Report Crime, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/24/sanctuary-cities-dont-breed-crime-they-encourage-people-
to-report-crime/?utm_term=.a737cf32dc28 [https://perma.cc/8L9P-2D96].
131 See Immigration Historical Trends, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/
1660/immigration.aspx [https://perma.cc/VKD9-CRHK].
132 See San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1125, 1231 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding
that any attempt to withhold federal grants for failure to enforce immigration detainers or
otherwise cooperate with federal officials would violate the principles of Separation of
Powers and the Constitution’s Spending Clause); United States v. California, 314 F. Supp.
3d 1077, 1109-10 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that California’s laws prohibiting local resources
from being used to enforce federal immigration laws were not preempted by federal law);
City of Chicago v. Sessions 321 F. Supp. 3d. 855, 881 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (issuing permanent
injunction of all immigration conditions to JAG funds on anti-commandeering and
statutory grounds), aff’d 888 F.3d 272, 293(7th. Cir. 2018); City of Phila. v. Sessions, 309
F. Supp. 3d 289, 331 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (finding that the conditions violated the Tenth
Amendment and constitutional principle of separation of powers); see also Lai & Lasch,
supra note 9, at 553 n.87 (discussing numerous unsuccessful attempts to pass anti-
sanctuary legislation in Congress).
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proceedings, freedom from racial profiling, and a focus on keeping
themsafe.As efforts to limit local immigrationpolicing progress, state
law has taken on new significance.133
III. STATE LAW’SHISTORICAL CONSTRAINTS
Detainers ask a local law enforcement officer to hold the
person identified in the local jail based on the allegation that he or
she is removable under the federal civil immigration laws. As
described in Part I, courts consider this a new arrest.134 While the
federal statutory and constitutional authority for these arrests
remains in dispute,135 state law can provide an independent barrier
to detainer enforcement. Because detainers ask local law
enforcement officers to arrest and detain immigrants for federal civil
violations, state lawmust authorize officers to perform these arrests.
An examination of the long-standing limits on local arrest
anddetention authority reveals a bulwarkagainst local immigration
enforcement. This Part reviews state laws concerning the sheriff’s
arrest authority, state officials’ obligation to take custody of federal
inmates, the right to bail pending state charges, and other state
constitutional protections. For more than a century, state statutes
have predicated arrest and detention on criminal offenses and
judicial review. Constitutional provisions in many states establish
additional checks on local law enforcement power. Historical state
laws therefore provide crucial support for policies that separate local
resources from federal immigration enforcement.
To eliminate state law barriers to detainer enforcement,
most states would need to repeal the traditional constraints on
law enforcement officers and enact broader law enforcement
powers, as the state of Texas did.136 The final section of Part III
outlines the costs of expanded arrest authority to political
133 See, e.g., City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 173 (5th Cir. 2018); Tenorio-
Serrano v. Driscoll, 324 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1060–64 (D. Ariz. 2018);; Creedle v. Miami-Dade
Cty., No. 17-Civ-22477, 2018 WL 6427713, at *22 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2018); C.F.C. v. Miami-
Dade Cty, 349 F. Supp. 3d. 1236, 1262–63 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Cisneros v. Elder, No. 18-CV-
30549, 2018 WL 7142016, at *7–8 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 6, 2018) (order granting summary
judgment); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1160 (Mass. 2017); Esparza v. Nobles
Cty, No. 53-CV-18-751, 2018 WL 6263254, at *10 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 19, 2018) (order
granting a temporary restraining order and injunction); Valerio-Gonzalez v. Jarret, 390Mont.
427 (2017) (denyingwrit of habeas corpus),); People ex rel.Wells v. DeMarco, 88N.Y.S.3d 518,
529–30 (App. Div. 2018); Nathan Brown, Jerome Commissioners Say it’s ICE’s Move on Jail
Contract, MAGICVALLEY (July 30, 2017), https://magicvalley.com/news/local/govt-and-politic
s/jerome-commissioners-say-it-s-ice-s-move-on-jail/article_e9cf1682-f1a3-5d41-afa5-889187
a93d24.html [https://perma.cc/SR2Z-74SR].
134 See discussion supra Part I note 51.
135 See supra Part I notes 64–77 and accompanying text.
136 See S.B. 4, 2017 Leg., 85th Sess. (Tex. 2017); see also El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at
173 (holding S.B. 4, “with one exception” facially valid).
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accountability, community safety and trust, policy uniformity,
and individual’s civil rights.
A. State Laws Limiting Local Arrest Authority
Because immigration detainers and the accompanying
administrative warrants ask local law enforcement officers to
hold individuals for a new purpose, state and federal courts have
concluded that their enforcement constitutes a new arrest.137
Federal law authorizes federal agents to arrest individuals for
immigration violations. Indeed, the administrative warrants
attached to detainers are directed exclusively to federal agents.138
But detainers ask local law enforcement officers, rather than
federal officials, to perform the arrests. Consequently, these
officers must have the power to do so. Federal statutes do not
supply this arrest authority.139 Instead, state law governs the
powers and duties of local law enforcement officers. Historically,
these laws and their common law sources have circumscribed this
authority in ways that exclude arrests for federal civil violations.
Accordingly, state law commonly precludes local officials from
performing the immigration arrests that detainers request.
1. Common Law Arrest Power
Responsibility for maintaining the custody of individuals
in local jails usually falls to county sheriffs.140 Immigration
detainers ask local officers to maintain custody of noncitizens in
local jails for up to forty-eight hours.141 Thus, the scope of the
137 See, e.g., Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015); Roy v. Cty.
of L.A., No. CV 12-09012-AB, 2018 WL 914773, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018); Ochoa v.
Campbell, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1249–50 (E.D. Wash. 2017); Cisneros, 2018 WL 7142016,
at *5–6; Lunn, 78 N.E.3d. at 1153; DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S.3d at 526.
138 Form I-200:Warrant forArrest of Alien, IMMIGR.&CUSTOMSENF’T, https://www.
ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/I-200_SAMPLE.PDF [https://perma.cc/
5QQJ-Y5W3] [hereinafter Form I-200]; Form I-205: Warrant of Removal/Deportation,
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/
2017/I-205_SAMPLE.PDF [https://perma.cc/PZ9W-A27G] [hereinafter Form I-205]; see also
8 C.F.R. § 241.2(b).
139 See e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae, Esparza v. Nobles Cty., Br. Law Scholars, Amici
Curiae, (Minn. Ct. App.) (filed Mar. 13, 2019) (describing statutory structure that authorizes
immigration arrests by local law enforcement in specific circumstances that do not include
detainer enforcement); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 408–09 (2012) (describing
detailed federal regulatory scheme that precludes inherent immigration arrest authority in
state and local law enforcement officers).
140 DAVIDR.STRUCKHOFF, THEAMERICANSHERIFF, 49, 54 (Justice Research Inst.
1994) (listing states in which sheriffs have responsibility for operating the jails by statutes
and stating the 89% of all sheriffs’ departments operate jails in their counties).
141 ICE Policy No. 10074.2, supra note 37, at 3-4. Form I-247A https://www.ice.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/I-247A.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q63A-GQZH].
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sheriff’s authority determines whether immigration detainers
are enforceable in most jurisdictions. An examination of the
traditional role of the sheriff demonstrates their lack of common
law authority to perform these arrests.
The office of the sheriff was imported to the American
colonies alongside English common law.142 The role of the sheriff
in England was to serve process, preserve the peace, administer
and enforce the laws, carry out the mandates of the courts, and
administer the county prisons.143 These responsibilities were
described as “three-fold custody”: (1) “custody of justice” through
serving process and returning jurors to hear trials; (2) “custody of
the law” through “execut[ing] [the courts’] decisions in civil and
criminal cases;” and (3) “custody of the commonwealth” through
keeping the peace.144 English sheriffs were also appointed by the
sovereign and responsible for tax collection.145
The role of the sheriff in the United States retained a
number of these core responsibilities, but it also evolved to reflect
the principles motivating the American Revolution.146 Most state
constitutions recognized the office of the sheriff.147 By 1890,
breaking with English tradition these state constitutions made
the sheriff accountable to the residents of their jurisdictions
through popular election in nearly every state.148 At the time the
office of the sheriff was incorporated into state constitutions, their
roles were defined in common law.149 The sheriff had the power
and duty to execute the mandates of the courts; to serve as the
conservator of the peace in his county, with authority to command
142 Id. at 22; WILLIAM L. MURFEE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE SHERIFFS AND
OTHERMINISTERIALOFFICERS § 1 (Eugene McQuillin ed., St. Louis, Gilbert Book Co. 2d ed.
1890); 1 WALTER H. ANDERSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SHERIFFS, CORONERS AND
CONSTABLES § 1 (1941).
143 1 ANDERSON, supra note 142, § 6; accordMURFEE, supra note 142, § 2; Steve
Gullion, Sheriffs in Search of a Role., 142 NEW L. J. 1156, 1157 (1992) (recounting the
history of the office of sheriff in England, Scotland and the United States).
144 David B. Kopel, The Posse Comitatus and the Office of Sheriff: Armed
Citizens Summoned to the Aid of Law Enforcement., 104 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 761,
787–88 (2015) (citing EDWARD COKE, 2 THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF LAWS OF
ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 168(A) (Book 3, ch. 1, § 248) (London
1823) (1628)); accordMURFEE, supra note 142, § 2.
145 STRUCKHOFF, supra note 140, at 9; VERN L. FOLLEY, AMERICAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT: POLICE, COURTS, AND CORRECTIONS 33 (Holbrook Press 1976). Until the
Magna Carta, English sheriffs had judicial functions, exercising jurisdiction over civil
and criminal cases in their towns. Gullion, supra note 143, at 1157.
146 James Tomberlin, Note, “Don’t Elect Me”: Sheriffs and the Need for Reform in
County Law Enforcement, 104 VA. L. REV. 113, 121–22 (2018); MURFEE, supra note 142, § 7.
147 Tomberlin, supra note 146, at 121; MURFEE, supra note 142, §§ 7, 43.
148 MURFEE, supra note 142, § 7; Kopel, supra note 144, at 786–87(stating that the
only exceptions areAlaska, which has no counties, andHawaii, Rhode Island, andConnecticut).
149 MURFEE, supra note 142, §§ 40–42 (stating that when the sheriff was recognized
as a constitutional officer by a state, the sheriff possessed all of the powers pertaining to that
office at common law).
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the manpower of the county through posse comitatus;150 and to
keep securely in confinement all such prisoners committed to his
charge “by civil or criminal process emanating from courts of
adequate jurisdiction.”151
Common law limited the sheriff’s arrest authority associated
with eachof these duties. The sheriff’s obligation to execute all process
delivered to him, as a custodian of the courts, included the power to
arrest.152 But this power came with constraints. Sheriffs generally
lacked authority to arrest individuals on initial process in civil cases
due to state statutes prohibiting debtor arrests.153 Arrests on
intermediate and final process in civil matters were authorized at
common law154 with certain restrictions on time and place.155 The
sheriff’s authority to effect a civil arrest, however, depended on
possessing process directing him to do so.156 This requirement
generates two barriers to enforcing immigration detainers. First,
under common law, process meant “something issuing out of a court
or from a judge.”157 The term was commonly used to encompass “the
writs issuing out of any court to bring the party to answer, or for
execution” including civil and criminal proceedings.158 Courts,
however, do not issue immigration detainers or administrative
warrants so that neither form fits within the common law definition
of “process.” Second, sheriffs had no power at common law “to execute
process unless it was directed to himor to the class of officers towhich
150 Kopel, supra note 144, at 761 (explaining that “[p]osse comitatus is the legal
power of sheriffs and other officials to summon armed citizens to aid in keeping the peace”).
151 MURFEE, supra note 142, § 40.
152 Id. § 40, 100–01.
153 Id. § 140.
154 Id. § 118a (describing the capias ad respondendum authorizing arrest for
contempt of court in English common law); see also id. § 205 (describing state statutes
authorizing and limiting arrests in civil matters which circumscribe common law arrest
authority for civil matters); 1 ANDERSON supra note 142, § 116(describing the capias ad
respondendum as intermediate process (before final judgment) under which a civil arrest
could be made under common law in the United States); MURFEE supra note 142, §§ 340–
62 (describing other forms of civil intermediate process that authorize arrest); 1 ANDERSON
supra note 142, § 242 (describing the capias ad satisfaciendum as the writ authorizing a
sheriff to take custody of someone to satisfy a final judgment). The same conditions apply
to final civil process as apply to intermediate civil process. 1 ANDERSON supra note 142,
§ 244; MURFEE, supra note 142, § 293.
155 MURFEE, supra note 142, §§ 149–50 (discussing time limitations); § 156–
58 (discussing one’s protection from civil arrest in one’s home); § 161 (discussing
limitation to sheriff’s county, excluding courthouses and property whose jurisdiction
is vested with the United States).
156 Id. § 151.
157 Id. § 117a; see also 1 ANDERSON, supra note 142, § 104 n.76a (including papers
authorized by statute in foreclosure of chattel mortgages and citing Idaho decision
describing process as “any writ, precept, warrant, or mandate issuing from a court,
tribunal, or person possessing judicial powers” (citing Blumaue-Frank Drug Co. v.
Branstetter, 43 P. 575 (Idaho 1895)).
158 MURFEE, supra note 142, § 117a.
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he belong[ed].”159 Though the detainer form is addressed to local
officials, the actual administrative warrant for arrest is directed only
to federal officers. At common law, an arrest on civil process was void
if an officer not named in the process executes it.160 Additionally, a
sheriff was liable for enforcing process he knows lacks jurisdiction or
is otherwise invalid.161 Finally, though common law allowed sheriffs
to detain an individual subject to writs from other parties in order to
answer those writs, that power is contingent upon possessing a valid
writ.162 “Process and writs” however “are synonymous terms” and are
issued by a court, tribunal, or person possessing judicial power.163
Immigration detainers, therefore, do not qualify as writs in common
law. Consequently, the sheriff’s common law arrest authority
accompanying his duty to execute civil process does not include the
power to arrest individuals based on immigration detainers and their
underlying administrative warrants.
Sheriffs also had arrest authority under common law in
order to fulfill their duty to keep the peace. This authority, though
broader than the power associated with executing process, was
still constrained in ways that exclude enforcement of immigration
detainers. This duty concerned criminal offenses and obligated
the sheriff to make arrests for breaches of the peace or to prevent
the commission of offenses that breach the peace, and then to
maintain custody of prisoners pending trial and upon
conviction.164 As “conservator of the peace,” he was also required
“to suppress riots, mobs, and insurrections.”165 In addition, state
statutes often mandated that the sheriff “take proper charge of
vagrants, disorderly persons, paupers, and lunatics” as well as
enforce laws against gambling and drinking establishments.166
The conditions of a lawful arrest for breaches of the peace
under common law incorporated centuries of English jurisprudence.
William Blackstone described this authority in 1775.167 Lawful
arrests fell into four categories: “1. By warrant: 2. By an officer
without warrant: 3. By a private person also without warrant: 4. By
a hue and cry.”168Blackstone described arrests in this context as “the
apprehending or restraining of one’s person, in order to be
159 Id. § 115a(describing an exception to this rule recognized by a Massachusetts
court if the officer who served the process otherwise had the authority to do so and the process
simply omitted the words that reflected that authority); 1 ANDERSON, supra note 142, § 101.
160 MURFEE, supra note 142, § 151.
161 Id. § 105.
162 Id. § 159 (describing detainer authority).
163 1 ANDERSON, supra note 142, § 103.
164 MURFEE, supra note 142, § 1160.
165 Id.
166 Id.; 2 ANDERSON supra note 142, § 624.
167 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289 (7th ed. 1775).
168 Id.
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forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime.”169
Warrantless arrests were lawful for felony offenses or breaches of
peace committed in the officer’s presence.170 Private persons could
likewise arrest without a warrant but only for felony offenses
committed in their presence.171 Similarly, English common law
recognized arrests in cases of “hue and cry raised upon a felony
committed.”172 This category of lawful arrest consisted of
townspeople “pursuingwith horn andwith voice, all felons, and such
as have dangerously wounded another.”173
Following the English common law’s constraints on the
arrest authority of the sheriff, common law in the United States
demanded that sheriffs arrest anyone committing an offense in his
presence without requiring a warrant.174 Sheriffs could also arrest
without a warrant if the person was suspected of committing a
felony offense.175 All other criminal arrests required warrants.176
Vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and prostitution are examples of
non-felony breach of peace offenses requiring legal process to
authorize arrest.177 A warrant, in turn, must be issued by a justice
with jurisdiction over the offense and must clearly set out the
criminal charge facing the defendant.178 Arrests on immigration
detainers lack both the criminal predicate and legal process
required at common law. Nor do they involve mobs, riots, and
insurrections; state statutes on vagrancy, disorderly conduct, or
insanity; or legislation directed at suppressing “immoral conduct”
such as gambling, drinking, and prostitution.
The common law power of the sheriff, borrowed from
England, did indeed include inherent arrest authority. This
authority was contingent though on the need to quell a mob, legal
process issuing from a court, or a criminal offense. No inherent
arrest power thus exists at common law to support local sheriffs
in enforcing immigration detainers.179
169 Id.
170 Id. at *292.
171 Id. at *292–93.
172 Id. at *293.
173 Id.
174 MURFEE, supra note 142, § 1161.
175 Id.
176 Id.; see also; Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 537–38 (1900); Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 498–99 (1885) (explaining that at common law a warrant would be required for
misdemeanors that had already been completed by the time the arresting officer appeared on
the scene); William Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 774, 792 n.44 (1993) (describing the common law standard
and citing nineteenth century cases concerning felonies).
177 MURFEE, supra note 142, § 1161a.
178 Id. § 1162.
179 The SolicitorGeneral’s office has taken a contrary position on the sheriff’s common
law authority but does not account for the specific historical limits on civil arrest power. Cf.
1114 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:4
A landmark case discussing the state law constraints on
local arrest authority confirms that common law powers do not
permit local immigration detainer enforcement.180 Mr. Lunn sued
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Sheriff of Suffolk
County for his detention at the Boston Municipal Court on the
basis of an immigration detainer after the state criminal charges
against him were dismissed.181 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
reviewed that state’s common law governing the authority of local
law enforcement officers.182 Recognizing that warrantless arrest
authority there stems from the English common law requirement
of a “breach of the peace” or felony offense, the court reviewed the
type of offenses constituting a breach of peace.183 The court
concluded that common law created no arrest authority for civil
violations.184 A civil immigration violation did not meet these
common law requirements.185 Nor did the state’s statutes supply
authority for these arrests.186 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
concluded that “[t]he prudent course is not for this court to create,
and attempt to define, some new authority for court officers to
arrest that heretofore has been unrecognized and undefined.”187
Rather, the court decided, “the better course is for us to defer to the
Legislature to establish and carefully define that authority if the
Legislature wishes that to be the law of this Commonwealth.”188
Given their common source in English common law and their
consistency across the United States documents in nineteenth
century treatises, the limits found by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court on the common law arrest powers of local law enforcement
officers are likely present in many, if not all, states.
2. Common Law Limits Are Codified by the States and
Reinforced in State Constitutions
During the late nineteenth century, many states codified
these common law principles thereby constraining the sheriff’s
arrest authority accordingly. Reviewing the sheriff’s arrest
Amicus Brief of United States in Esparza (MN); Amicus Brief of United States in Ramon (MT)
(asserting inherent common law arrest authority of sheriffs to enforce immigration detainers);
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 27, Lunn v.
Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017) (No. SJC-12276), 2017WL 1240651.
180 Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017).
181 Id. at 1148.
182 Id. at 1154–55.
183 Id. at 1154–55, 1155 n.20.
184 Id. at 1155.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1156.
187 Id. at 1158.
188 Id.
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power under the statutes of all states is beyond the scope of this
article. A series of decisions addressing the state statutory
authority of local law enforcement officers to enforce
immigration detainers, however, indicate that it is often lacking.
This section examines the statutes in several states in which
challenges to the local enforcement of immigration detainers is
ongoing or in which a high number of detainers are lodged.
These states have similar provisions that limit criminal and civil
arrest authority and exclude immigration detainer enforcement.
In Colorado, which ranks seventh in total number of
detainers received,189 two state residents challenged the El Paso
County Sheriff’s refusal to release them on pre-trial bond because
they were subject to immigration detainers.190 The plaintiffs
claimed their state constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure191 were violated because the sheriff was
holding them without legal authority.192
Like most states, Colorado set out the standards for lawful,
and therefore constitutional, arrests in its territorial laws.193 These
laws codified the common law arrest powers and are now the
exclusive source of this authority.194 Colorado’s statutes hew closely
to their common law source and require sheriffs to have a warrant
for arrest, to be present when the crime is committed, or to have
probable cause that an offense was committed and that the person
arrested committed that offense.195
The plaintiffs were successful on their claims of unlawful
arrest under state law.196 The constraints on officers’ arrest
authority,197 and the statutory definitions of an “offense” as a crime198
and a “warrant” as judicially issued199 combined to support summary
189 Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
190 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Individual
Claim for Damages at 3, 5, 11–12, Cisneros v. Elder, No. 18-CV-30549 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb.
27, 2018), 2018 WL 5284263 [hereinafter Cisneros Complaint].
191 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
192 Cisneros Complaint, supra note 190, at 12; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary
RestrainingOrder andPreliminary Injunction at 17, Cisneros v. Elder, No. 18-CV-30549 (. Colo.
Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2018), https://acluco-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/20
18-02-27-El-Paso-TRO-PI-Motion.pdf [hereinafter CisnerosMotion for Preliminary Injunction].
193 An Act Concerning Criminal Jurisprudence, sec. 158, 1861 Colo. Terr. Sess. Laws
290, 326; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC., arts. 226–31, 232–58 (1879) (describing arrests
without warrants and arrests under warrant, respectively).
194 Order Granting Summary Judgment at *7–10, Cisneros v. Elder, No. 2018-CV-
30549 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 16, 2018), 2018WL 7142016; People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 154
(Colo. 1983); Colorado Att’y Gen. Op., No. 99-7, 1999WL 33100121, at *3–4 (Sept. 8, 1999).
195 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102 (2018).
196 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 194, at *7–10.
197 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-102 (2018).
198 Id. § 18-1-104(1).
199 Id. § 16-1-104(18).
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judgment.200 Further, the state court found that no inherent
authority existed to fill the gaps left by state statute.201 In light of
these limits, the state judge enjoined the sheriff from “refusing to
release [people] who post bond, complete their sentences, or
otherwise resolve their criminal cases” due to immigration detainers
and administrative warrants based on Colorado’s statutory and
constitutional limitations on arrest.202 The laws in Georgia—fifth
highest in number of detainers lodged203—share the same roots204
and reflect the same constraints.205
A class action pending in Florida, fourth in the volume of
detainers,206 likewise asserted that local enforcement of immigration
detainers violates the state’s constitutional and statutory
protections against unreasonable arrests.207 The federal district
court found that plaintiffs alleged plausible state statutory and
constitutional violations and denied the county’s motion to dismiss
these claims.208 In a similar suit, the federal district court also denied
the county’s motion to dismiss that plaintiff’s false imprisonment
claim for holding him without legal authority.209
Litigation underway in Minnesota involves similar claims
that the state’s constitutions, statutes, and common law fail to
authorize the civil arrests associated with immigration detainers
and administrative warrants.210 Minnesota’s state courts have
concluded that the sheriff’s warrantless arrest authority is now
200 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 194, at *8.
201 Id. at *9–10 (citing Douglass v. Kelton, 610 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Colo. 1980)). But
seeOrder Denying Prelim. Injunction at *5–6, Salinas v. Mikesell, No. 18-CV-30057, (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 19, 2018) (finding that the sheriff’s inherent authority to keep the peace may
include making civil immigration arrests); Tenorio-Serrano v. Driscoll, 324 F. Supp. 3d
1053, 1060–62 (D. Ariz. 2018) (same).
202 Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 194, at *15.
203 Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
204 See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 13; Porter v. State, 52 S.E. 283, 285–86 (Ga. 1905)
(“Section 896 of our Penal Code [then] is a codification of the common law on the subject of
arrest, with perhaps a slight enlargement of the power of arrest. . . . Under the citation
from Hale, the power to arrest for such a minor offense, without a warrant, did not exist at
common law. Therefore it must depend upon statute; and there is no statute, of which we
are aware, authorizing a municipal police officer to make an arrest save in compliance with
the terms of the above-cited section of our Penal Code.”).
205 See Thomas v. State, 18 S.E. 305, 305 (1892) (“The policeman had no warrant,
nor was the offence committed in his presence. This being so, he had no legal authority to
make any arrest, unless it was reasonably proper to do so in order to prevent a failure of
justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. Code, § 4723.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-40
(2018) (requiring warrants to be issued by a judge or officer with the powers of a magistrate).
206 Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
207 Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, andMoney
Damages at 30–32, C.F.C. v.Miami-DadeCty., No. 1:18-CV-22956-JLK, 349F. Supp. 3d 1236
(S.D. Fla. 2018), ECF No. 1.
208 C.F.C. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1255–65 (S.D. Fla. 2018)
209 Creedle v. Miami-Dade Cty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
210 Class Action Complaint and Request for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Esparza v. Nobles Cty., No. 53-CV-18-751, (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 16, 2018), 2018WL 6430573.
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found in statute, which codified the common law power.211
Minnesota law further establishes that this authority is limited
to criminal violations.212
The Oregon Supreme Court expressly considered whether
an administrative warrant for an immigration violation rendered
an arrest reasonable under its state constitution.213 The case arose
after federal immigration officials arrested a man identified in an
administrative warrant while accompanied by local police officers
who found firearms in the house in violation of state criminal
law.214 The court first determined that the state’s constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure governed the
actions of local officers even if the arrest by federal immigration
officials was lawful under the Fourth Amendment.215 The state
conceded that the administrative warrant lacked the oath or
affirmation required by the Oregon’s constitution.216 Ultimately,
the court assumed that the seizure did not fall within an exception
to the warrant requirement and that the arrest was therefore
illegal, but ruled against the defendant on other grounds.217
Though the court did not make a final ruling on the validity of
administrative warrants under Oregon’s constitution, the
decision indicates that these warrants may well fall short of that
state’s independent constitutional requirements.
The attorney general of New York took a similar view of
its constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure.218 This constitutional right was implemented through
state statutes, passed more than one hundred years ago,219 setting
out the circumstances in which New York’s law enforcement
211 Wahl v. Walton, 16 N.W. 397, 397–98 (Minn. 1883) (stating that Minnesota
warrantless arrest statute “seems to be a re-enactment of the common-law rule,” and noting
expanded arrest authority for officers under statutory as compared to common law); Hilla
v. Jensen, 182 N.W. 902, 903 (Minn. 1921) (“The circumstances under which peace officers
may arrest without a warrant are defined in the statutes of the state.” (emphasis added)).
212 Witte v. Haben, 154 N.W. 662, 663–64 (Minn. 1915) (finding warrantless
arrest to be unlawful under the statute providing arrest authority for public offenses where
no crime and occurred or was suspected); MINN. STAT. § 630.18(7) (stating that a criminal
indictment “shall be dismissed by the court . . . when the facts stated do not constitute a
public offense”). Minnesota case law further supports that “public offense” has long been
and remains synonymous with “crime” underMinnesota law.See State v. Lee, 13 N.W. 913,
914 (Minn. 1882); Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn. 1990) (“Public offense
includes both misdemeanors and felonies, and need not involve a breach of peace.”).
213 State v. Rodriguez, 854 P.2d 399 (Ore. 1993).
214 Id. at 400–01.
215 Id. at 402–04, 407–09.
216 Id. at 402 n.7.
217 Id. at 406–07.
218 ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. OFF. OF ATTY GEN. GUIDANCE CONCERNING
LOCALAUTHORITYPARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATIONENFORCEMENTANDMODELSANCTUARY
PROVISIONS 5 (Jan. 19, 2017, suppl. Mar. 12, 2017) https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/
guidance_and_supplement_final3.12.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9X9-MTDQ].
219 See 1889 N.Y. Laws 430, ch. 342, tit. V, § 6.
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officers are permitted to make warrantless arrests.220 These
circumstances are limited to crimes or “offenses,” which the state
in turn defines as conduct that carries a penalty of imprisonment
or a fine.221 Because immigration detainers and administrative
warrants reflect probable cause of a civil violation, New York’s
attorney general concluded that local officers should enforce
detainers only if “they are accompanied by a judicial warrant”
that would render the arrest reasonable or when “there is
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.”222 A New
York state court recently sustained a writ of habeas corpus filed
by a noncitizen held in custody after completing his criminal
sentence for criminal contempt based on an immigration
detainer.223 The court concluded that the state’s statutes codified
the traditional common law arrest authority224 and these statutes
do not permit the warrantless arrest of individuals for civil
immigration violations.225 ICE’s administrative warrants did not
satisfy the state’s standard for warrants because they are not
issued by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer of the court.226 Further,
no residual arrest power inhered in local law enforcement officers
given the courts’ reliance exclusively on state statutes to
determine this authority.227 New York received the sixth largest
volume of detainers,228 yet the protections in state law preclude
their enforcement with or without an administrative warrant.
The arrest authority of local law enforcement officers has
been constrained by state statutes, constitutions, and common
law since the birth of this country. These limits balance the need
for broad police powers to maintain the peace and safety of
residents as well as for safeguards to protect those residents from
abusive and harassing enforcement. These safeguards require
legal process for civil arrests or probable cause of a crime. State
law therefore generally fails to supply sheriffs and other local law
enforcement with the arrest authority required to enforce
immigration detainers.
220 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 140.05–140.55 (McKinney 2018).
221 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(1) (McKinney 2018); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 1.20 (McKinney 2018).
222 SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 218, at 5.
223 People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S.3d 518, 536 (App. Div. 2018).
224 Id. at 531.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 528–29.
227 Id. at 530.
228 Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
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B. State Laws Regulating Cooperation Between Federal
and State Law Enforcement Agencies
Between the push of the Trump administration’s attempt
to crack down on “sanctuary” jurisdictions and the pull of
immigrant communities, sheriffs in some states have sought ways
to comply with detainers that shield them from political
responsibility and legal liability.229 This includes reliance on laws
dating back nearly two centuries, enacted in response to
Congress’s initial attempt to govern cooperation between federal
and local officials.230 These laws required sheriffs to take custody
of federal detainees and remain in effect in most states today.231
229 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Cisneros v.
Elder, 18-CV-30459, 2018 WL 5284263, at *9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2018); Gaultieri
Memo, supra note 78 (proposing the use of federal contracts and detention orders to
require ongoing custody of immigrants in state jails); see also Brown, supra note 133
(quoting Vaughn Killeen, executive director of the Idaho Sheriffs Association, as pointing
to Idaho Code § 20-615 and stating that “[i]mmigration holds are federal prisoners and
you really don’t need a contract . . . just house them and bill ICE $75 a day. Without the
contract the controversy goes away, or at least the significant issue causing the
demonstrations” (omission in original)).
230 See Tenorio-Serrano v. Driscoll, 324 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1060–63 (D. Ariz.
2018); Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 194, at *9; Brown, supra note
133; see also Creedle v. Miami-Dade Cty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1306–08 (S.D. Fla. 2018);
C.F.C. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 349 F. Supp. 3d. 1236, 1259–62) (S.D. Fla. 2018); Valerio-
Gonzalez v. Jarret, 390 Mont. 427 (Mont. 2017) (denying writ of habeas corpus).
231 See ALA. CODE § 14-6-4 (2018) (enacted as early as 1852); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31-122 (2019) (enacted as early as 1887 as § 2447); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-
503(g) (2019) (1837); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4005 (Deering 2018) (enacted as early as 1872
as § 1601); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-26-123 (2018) (enacted as early as 1877 as
§ 1400); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-91 (West 2018) (enacted as early as 1949); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 950.03 (West 2018) (enacted as early as 1847); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-9
(West 2019) (enacted as early as 1863 as § 334); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353-101 (West
2018) (enacted 1959); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-615 (2018) (enacted as early as 1864 as
§ 31); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4 (West 2019) (enacted as early as 1827 as “An Act
Concerning Jails and Jailers”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 356.1 (West 2019) (enacted as early
as 1839 as “An Act for the Appointment and Duties of Sheriff”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-
1930 (West 2019) (enacted as early as 1868); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.035 (West 2019)
(enacted as early as 1873 as “Jail and Jailers,” Article I, §§ 4–5); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:707
(2018) (enacted as early as 1870); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 1554 (2019) (enacted
as early as 1821); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 801.101 (West 2019) (enacted 1846); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 641.03 (West 2019) (enacted as early as 1851); MISS. CODEANN. § 19-25-81
(West 2019) (enacted 1848); MO. ANN. STAT. § 221–270 (West 2018) (enacted as early as
1824); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-420 (West 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.060 (West
2019) (enacted 1861 as “An Act In Relation to Common Jails, and the Prisoners
Thereof”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-B:16 (2018) (enacted 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-
2 (West 2019) (enacted as early as 1877); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-16 (West 2019) (enacted
as early as 1865); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 612 (McKinney 2018) (enacted as early as 1929);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-34 (West 2019) (1790); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 341.21 (West
2019) (as early as 1806); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 16a (West 2019) (enacted as early as
1890); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.540 (West 2019) (enacted as early as 1854); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-25-13 (2018) (as early as 1925); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-5-60 (2018)
(enacted 1790); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-11-6 (2019) (enacted as early as 1862 as part
of the Dakota Territories); TENN. CODEANN. § 41-4-105 (West 2019) (enacted 1801); TEX.
LOC. GOV’TCODEANN. § 351.043 (West 2018) (enacted 1856); UTAHCODEANN. §§ 17-22-
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In 1789, the First Congress—even before it proposed the
Bill of Rights—enacted a law requesting that the states pass
statutes requiring the keepers of their jails to receive and
maintain custody of “all prisoners committed under the authority
of the United States.”232 The goal was to fix a basic problem: the
federal government had created courts to apply federal law and
U.S. marshals to enforce it, but had nowhere to put its
prisoners.233 In response to Congress’s plea, every state, with the
exception of Georgia, complied.234 Within a few decades, some
states withdrew their commitment—possibly in response to the
federal government’s failure to make good on its promise to pay
for the space in state jails.235 Nonetheless, thirty-nine states
continue to have laws in effect that stem from this early act of
Congress and require some degree of cooperation between state
9, 17-22-10 (West 2018) (enacted as early as 1876); VA. CODEANN. § 53.1-79 (West 2018)
(as early as 1789); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-8 (West 2018) (adopted from Virginia law
whenWest Virginia separated from Virginia in 1861 and joined the Union in 1863); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 18-6-305 (West 2019) (enacted 1869 as “An Act Concerning Jails”).
232 Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 96 (1789). The full text provided:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That it be recommended to the legislatures of
the several States to pass laws, making it expressly the duty of the keepers of
the gaols, to receive and safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the
authority of the United States, until they shall be discharged by due course of
the laws thereof, under the like penalties as in the case of prisoners committed
under the authority of such States respectively; the Unites States to pay for
the use and keeping of such gaols, at the rate of fifty cents per month for each
prisoner that shall, under their authority, be committed thereto, during the
time such prisoner shall be therein confined; and also to support such of said
prisoners as shall be committed for offences.
Id.
233 LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY 402 (1948).
234 Id. at 402 n.44; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909-10 (1997)
(discussing Congress’s assumption in this Act that it could not command into service the
states’ executive powers and emphasizing that Congress’s response to Georgia’s refusal
was to rent its own jails rather than force compliance).
235 See 16 Annals of Cong. 1193–94 (1821) (discussing move by Ohio to refuse
federal prisoners and proposed resolution to rent jail space in those states refusing to
take custody of federal prisoners), 1830–31 (resolution so providing); see also 1821 Ohio
Laws 1185 (“An Act to Withdraw from the Bank of the United States the Protection and
Aid of the Laws of this State, In Certain Cases”) (discussing the federal government’s
failure to pay hundreds of dollars in costs for the use of the state’s jails to house federal
prisoners). Cf.Wesley Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE
L. J. 1104, 1110 (2013) (proposing that the Act of Sept. 23, 1789 had less relevance to the
Founders’ understanding of the federal power to commandeer state resources than the
Printzmajority ascribed in light of restrictions on how payment for state jail space could
be made); Ronald Chen, State Incarceration of Federal Prisoners After September 11:
Whose Jail is it Anyway? 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1335, 1346–52 (2004) (discussing New
Jersey’s “take custody” law, enacted in 1877, and concluding that sheriffs remain
accountable to state law and an inmate’s custody is governed by state law even in the
case of prisoners held under federal law on behalf of the federal government).
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and federal law enforcement officers. The “take custody” statutes
do not explicitly provide arrest authority; nonetheless, county
sheriffs have relied on them as a basis for continuing to hold
immigrants at the federal government’s request. These claims are
making their way through state and federal courts.236
Though the law in each state varies somewhat, the “take
custody” provisions fall into four broad categories. To develop these
categories, state statutes that exist in all fifty states were reviewed
to identify key phrases common to many of these laws that set out
the conditions for state cooperation with federal law enforcement.
From there, the statutes were grouped into four separate strains
based on these key phrases; the cases citing each state statute were
further evaluated. Because this case law is sparse, state court
opinions were also assessed to determine how the key phrases in
other settings were interpreted. The findings of this survey are
discussed here; the statutory text and citing references are set out
in the appendix.237 The section concludes that neither immigration
detainers nor the administrative warrants that accompany them
comply with the core requirements contained in state “take
custody” provisions. These state statutes therefore do not authorize
local law enforcement officers to arrest a state resident for violating
federal civil laws, as detainers request.
1. “Take Custody” Statutes Limited to Criminal
Offenders
These laws fall into four broad categories. The first group
of statutes limits the obligations of state jailers to taking custody
only of individuals detained for criminal offenses. The provisions
in Nebraska and Ohio refer specifically to criminal charges and
236 Compare Creedle v. Miami-Dade Cty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1307 (S.D. Fla.
2018) (rejecting take custody statute as providing arrest authority) and C.F.C. v. Miami-
Dade Cty, 349 F. Supp. 3d. 1236, 1262(S.D. Fla. 2018) and Cisneros v. Elder, No. 18-CV-
30549, 2018WL 7142016, at *8–9 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 6, 2018) (same)withTenorio-Serrano
v. Driscoll, 324 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1060–63 (D. Ariz. 2018) (stating that the equivalent state
law may authorize arrests pursuant to detainers and administrative warrants) and
Valerio-Gonzalez v. Jarret, 390 Mont. 427 (Mont. 2017) (concluding that the equivalent
state law does authorize detainers with administrative warrants).
237 Credit for the fifty-state survey and state case law interpreting the key phrases
goes to research assistant Naomi Doraisamy. Naomi’s insights into how state courts have
applied the terms “process,” “duly committed,” and “under the authority of the United States”
were instrumental in identifying the core requirements for state cooperation. To be clear, Part
III of this article focuses on two principal sources of the sheriff’s authority common to most
states: arrest authority and duty to keep the jails. It does not purport to present an exhaustive
review of the arrest authority of local law enforcement officers in every state. The scope of a
sheriff’s powers and obligations in a given state may be further defined by state statutes and
court decisions not reviewed here.
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criminal convictions.238 Laws in New Hampshire, Colorado, and
Alabama refer to people held for “offenses against the United
States.”239 Colorado statute defines the term “offense” to refer
only to violations of criminal law,240 while Alabama’s state law
refers to “any criminal charge or offense.”241 New Hampshire’s
Supreme Court has likewise made clear that the terms “offense”
and “crime” are interchangeable.242 An opinion by the Illinois
attorney general also interpreted that state’s statute to require
a state or federal criminal charge.243 Immigration detainers and
administrative warrants, issued for alleged civil violations,
clearly do not meet this requirement.244
238 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-420 (West 2019) (“The Director of Correctional
Services shall receive, safely keep, and subject to the discipline of the Department of
Correctional Services, any criminal convicted of any crime against the United States, and
sentenced to confinement therein by any court of the United States sitting within this state,
until such sentence is executed or until such offender is discharged by due course of law. The
United States shall support such offender and pay the expenses of executing his sentence.”);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 341.21 (West 2019) (stating, in relevant part: “The board of county
commissioners may direct the sheriff to receive into custody prisoners charged with or
convicted of crime by the United States, and to keep those prisoners until discharged. The
board of the county inwhich prisoners chargedwith or convicted of crime by theUnited States
may be so committed may negotiate and conclude any contracts with the United States for
the use of the jail as provided by this section and as the board sees fit”).
239 ALA. CODE § 14-6-4 (2018) (“The sheriff or jailer must, if the jail of the county
is sufficient, receive into his custody any person committed under any criminal charge or
offense against the United States and safely keep such prisoner, according to the order or
process of commitment, until duly discharged by law; and he is liable to the same penalties
for the escape of such prisoner as for the escape of a prisoner committed under the authority
of this state.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-26-123 (2018) (“It is the duty of the keeper of
each county jail to receive into the jail every person duly committed thereto for any offense
against the United States, by any court or officer of the United States, and to confine every
such person in the jail until he is duly discharged, the United States paying all the expenses
of the confinement, safekeeping, and custody of such person, including the keeper’s fees, at
the rate established by the board of county commissioners of the county where such jail is
situated.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-B:16 (2018) (“The superintendent of the county
department of corrections may receive and keep every person duly committed thereto for
any offense against the United States paying all expenses for the confinement and
safekeeping of such person, at a rate established by the county commissioners of the county
where such facility is located.”).
240 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-104(1) (2019) (“The terms ‘offense’ and ‘crime’
are synonymous.”).
241 ALA. CODE § 14-6-4 (2019). Alabama statutes also define “offense” only within
the criminal code. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-2(10) (2019).
242 State v. Miller, 115 N.H. 662, 664 (N.H. 1975) (“Until the enactment of the
Criminal Code all ‘offenses’ were either misdemeanors or felonies and the term ‘crimes’ and
‘offenses’ were synonymous. Thus in the statutes outside of the Criminal Code ‘crimes’ are
‘offenses’ and ‘offenses’ are ‘crimes.’”) (emphasis added).
243 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4 (2018); See generally Letter from William J.
Scott, Ill. Att’y Gen.to Frank X. Yackley, State’s Attorney La Salle Cty. (July 26, 1977),
illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/1977/S-1284.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZX9-BW3P].
244 See Cisneros v. Elder, No. 18-CV-30549, 2018 WL 7142016, at *8–9 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 6, 2018).
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2. “Take Custody” Statutes Explicitly Requiring
Direction from the Federal Courts
The second category consists of laws that explicitly require
an order or some other action by federal courts. The laws in Iowa,
Michigan, Mississippi, New York, Oregon, and Utah comprise this
group.245 These statutes explicitly require review or direction by a
U.S. court in order to take custody of the subject of that document.
Typical of this category is Mississippi’s requirement of “legal
process from the officers of the courts of the United States.”246 Iowa
permits the use of its county jails only to “persons detained or
committed by authority of the courts of theUnited States[.]”247Both
Michigan and New York require direction from “a court of record
instituted under the authority of the United States.”248 These
states, except Iowa and Utah, also include the requirement of
process—“civil process” in Michigan and New York,249 “legal
process” in Mississippi,250 and “civil or criminal process” in Oregon.
The term “process” also incorporates the requirement of direction
from a court, as described in the next category of statutes, but the
states in the second category make that condition explicit through
referencing court action directly in the text.
In these states, this explicit requirement of U.S. court
involvement is not met by immigration detainers and administrative
warrants. As discussed in Part I, immigration detainers and
administrative warrants are issued by federal immigration
enforcement agents. They are not directed by a court or reviewed by a
judicial officer.251 Accordingly, “take custody” statutes in these states
cannot provide the affirmative authority required for sheriffs and
other local officers to enforce immigration detainers.
Utah’s law also references federal courts but in a way that
limits the scope of the statute to individuals in custody for
proceedings before the federal judiciary, not administrative
adjudicators. That state law requires sheriffs to take custody only
245 IOWA CODE ANN. § 356.1 (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 801.101 (2018);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-25-81 (2018); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 612(1) (McKinney 2018); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 169.530 (2018) UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-9. See Appendix for text of the
statutes. New York receives the sixth most detainers of any state in the country. See Latest
Data: TRAC, supra note 25. New York’s requirement for a federal court order thus
eliminates this statute as a potential source of authority to enforce thousands of detainers.
246 MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-25-81 (2019).
247 IOWA CODE ANN. § 356.1 (West 2019).
248 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 801.101 (2019); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 612(1) (McKinney
2019) (emphasis added).
249 MICH.COMP.LAWS § 801.101 (2019); N.Y.CORRECT.LAW § 612(1) (McKinney 2019).
250 MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-25-81 (2019).
251 See 8C.F.R. §§ 287.5(e), 236.1(b)(1), 287.8(c)(ii) (2018); see also 8U.S.C. § 1236(a)
(2012 & Supp. V 2018); supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
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of “[p]ersons convicted of crime in any of the courts of the United
States in the state of Utah as well as prisoners held to answer
before such courts for a violation of any of the laws of the United
States.”252 Because the custody mandate is limited to individuals
subject to courts with jurisdiction to convict individuals of federal
crimes, detained immigrants, who are under the jurisdiction of
administrative immigration courts, fall outside the statute.
3. “Take Custody” Statutes Requiring “Process”
The laws of eleven states refer specifically to legal process
or a specific legal instrument that authorizes detention as a
condition for local custody of federal prisoners.253 Many of these
laws contain similar language so that case law interpreting a
statute in one state can inform the meaning of its equivalent in
another state. California’s law, for example, provides that
the sheriff shall receive, and keep in the county jail, any prisoner
committed thereto by process or order issued under the authority of
the United States, until he or she is discharged according to law, as if
he or she had been committed under process issued under the
authority of this state.254
Arizona, Idaho, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota
have nearly identical provisions.255 Statutes in Florida, NewMexico,
Utah, Virginia, andWest Virginia vary somewhat but still condition
cooperation on “process.”256 State courts have rarely been called on
to interpret these laws, and when they have, disputes have centered
primarily on the payment requirements.257 The California Supreme
Court, however, issued the only decision applying a “take custody”
252 UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-9.
253 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-122 (2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4005 (Deering
2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 950.03 (West 2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-615 (2018); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 641.03 (West 2019); N.M.STAT. ANN. § 33-3-16 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 57, § 16a (2018); S.D. CODIFIEDLAWS § 24-11-6 (2019); UTAHCODEANN. §§ 17-22-9, 17-
22-10 (West 2018); VA. CODEANN. § 53.1-79 (West 2018); W.VA. CODE § 7-8-8 (West 2018).
254 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4005 (Deering 2018).
255 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-122 (2019); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-615 (2018);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 641.03 (West 2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 16a (West 2019); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 24-11-6 (2019).
256 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 950.03 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-3-16 (West 2019);
S.D.CODIFIEDLAWS § 24-11-6 (2019); UTAHCODEANN. §§ 17-22-9, 17-22-10 (West 2018);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-79 (West 2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-8 (West 2018).
257 See, e.g., Sonoma v. Santa Rosa, 102 Cal. 426 (1894) (discussing process and
commitment authority in discussion of whether Sonoma County or the City of Santa Rosa
was liable for costs for a prisoner committed by a city recorder); Richter v. St. Paul, 29
Minn. 198 (1882) (discussing whether municipality bore liability for prisoner committed by
municipal court); see also Avery v. Pima Cty., 7 Ariz. 26 (1900) (discussing whether sheriff
or county was entitled to payment from the federal government for housing federal
prisoners); Cty. of L.A. v. Cline, 185 Cal. 299 (1921) (same); Bd. of Comm’rs v. Mars, 117
P.2d 129 (Okla. 1941) (same, collecting cases).
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provision to detained immigrants before sheriffs began invoking
them in defense of detainer enforcement in 2018.258
In 1891, the California Supreme Court considered the
meaning of California’s “take custody” mandate as applied to
immigrants detained under the Chinese Exclusion Act.259 Mr. Ah
Teung was accused of assisting another Chinese immigrant, Lee
Yick,with escaping from theAlameda county jail.260 The question for
the court waswhether the custody of Lee Yickwas lawful; if not,Mr.
AhTeung could not be guilty of the crime of assisting in his escape.261
Lee Yick had been confined to the county jail based on the
declaration of a U.S. court commissioner that Mr. Yick was present
in the country in violation of the Chinese Exclusion Act.262 U.S. court
commissioners supported federal courts in a role that became the
position of U.S. magistrate judge.263 No formal judgment for Mr.
Yick, however, was ever issued based on the commissioner’s finding,
nor did a U.S. commissioner or judge of the court issue an order for
Mr. Yick to be held in the Alameda county jail.264
The California Supreme Court examined the question of
whether the U.S. commissioner’s finding alone satisfied the
requirement for “process or order” to require the county jailer to take
custody ofMr. Yick as a federal prisoner.265The court’s responsewas,
“We think not.”266 Consequently, the county deputy sheriff had no
authority to detain Mr. Yick without a formal judgment from a U.S.
district court or designated court commissioner.267 Only a “certified
copy of the judgment” from the U.S. court or its commissioner could
serve as the “process or order” that the California law required.268
258 Only one case applies this law to detained immigrants. See People v. Ah Teung,
28 P. 577, 577(Cal. 1891); see alsoAppendix (outlining citing references to each state statute).




263 Four years after the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress “drawing on the English
and colonial tradition of having localmagistrates and justices of the peace serve as committing
officers, . . . authorized federal circuit courts to appoint ‘discreet persons learned in the law’
[and] to accept bail for them.” SeePeter G. McCabe, A Guide to the FederalMagistrate Judge
System 3, 3 n.9 (Fed. Bar Ass’n White Paper (Aug. 2014) (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22,
§ 4, 1 Stat. 334 (1793)). These individuals absorbed more duties—accepting bail, issuing
arrest and search warrants, and holding people for trial—as their role developed into the
commissioner system. The system was reconstituted through the Act of May 28, 1896 and
U.S. commissioners became U.S. magistrate judges. Id. at 3 n.11. For an example of a
declaration of a U.S. commissioner, see generally United States ex. rel. Scott v. Burdick, 46
N.W. 572 (Dakota 1875).
264 Ah Teung, 28 P. at 577.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 577–78.
268 Id. at 577; see also Bruner v. Superior Court of S.F. 92 Cal. 239, 247 (1891)
(holding that process embraces everything ordered by any court or judge which has to be
executed by an officer).
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Laws from other states with identical or similar provisions
requiring “process” also reflect the need for a court-issued
document before sheriffs can take custody of federal prisoners.
The state of Idaho adopted California’s “take custody” law in 1864
and interpreted the meaning of process several years later.269 The
Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho explained, “Strictly
speaking ‘process,’ as its etymology shows, is something issuing
out of, or from a court or judge.”270 Indeed, in 1887, Idaho’s law
included the caption: “Sheriff must receive prisoners committed
by U.S. courts.”271 Idaho’s territorial legislature provided an
accompanying definition in its first code of civil procedure.272
“Process” was defined as “a writ or summons issued in the course
of judicial proceedings” and “writ” was, in turn, defined as “an
order or precept in writing, issued in the name of the people, or of
a Court or judicial officer.”273 Nearly one hundred and fifty years
later, Idaho’s Supreme Court confirmed that the term “process”
means judicial orders and the authority to compel compliance
with the enumerated duties delegated to sheriffs.274
The Dakota Territory and then later North Dakota had a
nearly identical “take custody” statute. The law has been
withdrawn but the North Dakota Supreme Court provided an
extensive definition for “process” a century ago.275 The court
explained that “process”
comprehends all the acts of the court, from the beginning of the
proceeding to its end. In a narrower sense, it is the means of
compelling a defendant to appear in court, after suing out the original
269 See John F., Compiler MacLane. Rev. Codes of Idaho, tit. 3, § 8529 (1908)
(historical notes); Compiled Statutes of Idaho, Ch. 337, Sec. 9419 (1919); An Act Concerning
Sheriffs, ch. 129, art. 6, § 41 (Apr. 29, 1851), S. GARFIELDE & F.A. SNYDER, COMPILERS,
COMPILEDLAWS OF THE STATE OFCALIFORNIA (Boston, Franklin Printing House 1853 Apr.).
The historical notes to Idaho’s statute also cite an analogous law inNorth Dakota, adopted in
1877, which requires sheriffs and jail officials to receive into custody any person “sent or
committed, by virtue of legal process issued by or under the authority of the United
States . . . as if such prisoners had been committed to their custody by virtue of legal process
issued under the authority of this territory.” See Compiled Statutes of Idaho, ch. 337, § 9419
[8529] (1919) (historical notes); 1914 N.D. Laws Compiled Laws of the State of North Dakota,
1913,N.D. Cent. Code § 11346 (1914); GeorgeH., EditorHand. Revised Codes of the Territory
of Dakota, Comprising the Codes and General Statutes Passed at the Twelfth Session of the
Legislative Assembly, and all other General Laws Remaining in Force § 648 (1877).
270 People v. Nash, 1 Idaho 206, 210 (Idaho Terr. 1868).
271 1887 Idaho Sess. Laws 880; see also IDAHO CODE § 5875 (1901).
272 1881 Idaho Sess. Laws 3.
273 Id. at 2.
274 See Hart v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 301 P.3d 627, 630 (Idaho 2012) (citing
Nash, 1 Idaho at 210).
275 Blair v. Maxbass Sec. Bank, 176 N.W. 98, 100 (N.D. 1919). North Dakota’s
“take custody” statute was still in effect in 1905, but was no longer by the 1913 compilation.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10455 (1905); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 3518–19 (1913) (setting fees for
housing United States prisoners, but no equivalent “take custody” statute).
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writ in civil, and, after indictment, in criminal, cases. In every sense,
it is the act of the court.276
Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a
broader interpretation and limited the term to court-issued
documents:
“Process,” in a large acceptation, is nearly synonymous with
“proceedings,” and means the entire proceedings in an action from the
beginning to the end. In a stricter sense it is applied to the several
judicial writs issued in an action. In this last sense it is manifestly
used in the [Minnesota] constitution, and when used in this sense we
believe it only applies to judicial instruments issued by a court or
other competent jurisdiction and returnable to the same.277
In Arizona, courts also equate legal process with warrants or
other court-issued orders.278 The term “process,” thus embodies
the bedrock requirements of a sworn statement of probable
cause, reviewed and approved by a neutral magistrate, or a court
order mandating custody in order to carry out some other
judicial proceeding.279
276 Blair, 176 N.W. at 17 (continuing, “Anymeans of acquiring jurisdiction is properly
denominated process. The term is sufficiently comprehensive to include an attachment,
garnishment, or execution. A writ is process and process is a writ, interchangeably.”).
277 Hanna v. Russell, 12 Minn. 80, 86 (1866) (citations omitted).
278 See, e.g., Walsh v. State, 450 P.2d 392, 398 (Ariz. 1969) (court referred to a
detainer filed by California pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by California as removal
“by legal process”); Platt v. Greenwood, 69 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Ariz. 1937) (sheriff defending
against civil suit for false imprisonment and unlawful arrest could not show that an alleged
misdemeanor had occurred in his presence to justify the underlying warrantless arrest and
thus acting without the “necessary legal process or authority”); Christiansen v. Weston,
284 P. 149, 153 (Ariz. 1930) (“proper process” to arrest a person was to file complaint and
obtain a court order for commitment).
279 See, e.g.,Ex parteCameron, 14 So. 97, 98 (Ala. 1893) (a warrant of commitment
issued by a Justice of the Peace, “irregular and illegal upon its face, and based upon an
affidavit which charged no offense,” could be corrected by the Justice of the Peace and thus
become legal warrant); Collins v. Lean, 9 P. 173, 174-75 (Cal. 1885) (search warrant was
proper because it was issued by a justice of the peace and based on affidavit conforming to
“both constitutional and statutory requirements”); Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So. 2d 494, 501–
02 (Fla. 1954) (holding that a warrant of commitment had to be supported by probable
cause, which could not “be determined by the Justice of the Peace without a trial” to
measure if there was “competent proof independent of admissions, confessions, and
presumptions that a public offense had been committed”); Watkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. (5
Tyng) 506, 511–12 (Mass. 1810) (addressing requirements for valid legal process to
authorize arrest and liability for providing false testimony to the process-issuing court);
State ex rel. Zugschwerd v. Holm, 34 N.W. 748, 749 (Minn. 1887) (required process for
relator to be re-arrested was the same for requirement to be arrested in the first place:
complaint in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the complainant before the justice stating
the relator had committed it, and justice approval); Lenski v. O’Brien, 232 S.W. 235, 238
(Mo. Ct. App. 1921) (“[T]he magistrate ought to have before him the oath of the real accuser
presented either in the form of an affidavit or taken down by himself by personal
examination, inserting the facts on which the charge is based, and on which the belief or
suspicion of guilt is founded. The magistrate can then judge for himself and not trust to the
judgment of another, whether sufficient and probable cause exists for issuing a warrant.”);
State v. Wimbush, 9 S.C. 309, 314 (S.C. 1878) (requiring new trial when trial justice issued
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Consequently, immigration detainers—even when
accompanied by administrative warrants—do not include the
imprimatur of a court, as the terms “process” and “order”
require. A warrant signed by an immigration enforcement
agent280 simply cannot satisfy these statutes’ historical demands.
This is true for the administrative warrants of arrest and
warrants of deportation/removal alike. Though the warrant of
removal/deportation is based on a final order of removal that
may be issued by an immigration adjudicator (though not
necessarily),281 the warrant itself is signed by an enforcement
agent without any review by a judge in any court to verify its
validity or the probability of removal notwithstanding the
passage of time and potential bases for reopening the order.
Regardless of the type of administrative warrant attached to the
detainer, at bottom, a state law enforcement officer is
performing the civil arrest without a directive from a court.
These state laws do not authorize such arrests.
4. “Take Custody” Statutes Requiring “the Authority of
the United States”
The statutes in the last category require only that the person
is detained under the “authority of the United States.”282 These laws
warrants to search and arrest, but information upon which warrants were founded were
not given under oath but consisted of mere unsworn written statement); Wells v. Jackson,
3 Munf. 458, 482 (Va. 1811) (holding that warrant was illegal when prosecutor summarily
erased name of subject of already-sworn arrest warrant and wrote appellant’s name
instead, stating, “It is illegal, unconstitutional, and void because it leaves [the identity of
the subject] to the discretion and judgment of the officer”); see alsoMartin v. State, 199 So.
98, 102 (Miss. 1940) (circuit clerks themselves do not have authority to issue warrants).
280 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2018) (listing positions within the Department of Homeland
Security authorized to issue immigration warrants).
281 See Form I-205 https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/
2017/I-205_SAMPLE.PDF [https://perma.cc/E3H6-B73E].
282 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-9 (West 2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 1554
(2019); MO. ANN. STAT. § 221-270 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.060 (West
2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:8-2 (West 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-34 (West 2019);
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-25-13 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-5-60 (2018); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 41-4-105 (West 2019); accord KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-1930 (West 2019). Kentucky’s
current statutory language requires receipt and confinement of “persons committed under
the laws of the United States”; the original version, enacted February 3, 1798, required
receipt of “any prisoner or prisoners whomay be from time to time committed to his charge,
under the authority of the United States.” See An Act for the Safe-Keeping of Prisoners
Committed under the Authority of the United States into Any of the Jails of This
Commonwealth, sec. 1, ch. 35, 1798 Ky. Sess. Laws 57. In 1893, a statute with the current
language “persons committed under the laws of the United States” was enacted in its place.
See An Act Concerning Jailers, ch. 181, art. 1, sec. 2, 1893 Ky. Sess. Laws 751, 752. The
state’s courts have relied on the original statutory text for its meaning. In 1830, the
Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the original statutory language in Johnson v. Lewis,
31 Ky. 182, 183 (1833); see also Bank of the United States v. Tyler, 29 U.S. 366, 388 (1830)
(citing Kentucky’s statute). In 1933, after the change to the statutory text, the Kentucky
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can be found in Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri,
Nevada,NewJersey,NorthCarolina, Rhode Island, SouthCarolina,
and Tennessee.283 Years of judicial review have defined this phrase
to incorporate the requirement of process. State courts elaborated
what was required for someone to be held in custody “under the
authority of the United States” principally through habeas
challenges brought by soldiers arrested for desertion by federal
officers, held in state jails, and filed in state court.284
A crisis was emerging in the lead up to the Civil War as
President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
federal courts—first regionally, then nationwide—left state and
lower federal courts to struggle with the effects.285 In the 1850s,
some state courts were invalidating the decisions of federal
courts applying federal laws, depending on that state’s
particular position on slavery and secession.286
Court of Appeals interpreted this statute in the context of who retained payment for
housing the federal prisoner and relied on the state supreme court’s prior decision in
Johnson v. Lewis, stating, “A jailer of Kentucky is bound to receive persons committed by
authority of United States and keep them until discharged in due course by the laws of the
United States.” See Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37, 41–42 (1931).
283 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-9 (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-1930 (West 2019);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.035 (West 2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 1554 (2019); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 221-270 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.060 (West 2019); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:8-2 (West 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 162-34 (2019); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-25-13 (2018); S.C. CODEANN. § 24-5-60 (2018); TENN. CODEANN. § 41-4-105 (2018).
284 See, e.g., In re Farrand, 8 F. Cas. 1070, 1073 (D. Ky. 1867) (Kentucky district
court ordered release of a commander held in contempt of state court for refusing to comply
with habeas proceedings for underage soldier held for desertion: “[A]fter the return [to habeas
corpus] is made, and the state judge or court is judicially apprized that the party is in custody
under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further.”); Ex parteMerryman,
17 F. Cas. 144, 151–52 (C.C.D. Md. 1861); In re Ferguson, 9 Johns. 239, 239–41 (N.Y. 1812)
(SupremeCourt of Judicature ofNewYork deniedwrit of habeas corpus for lack of jurisdiction
when underage soldier argued he should have been released and discharged from the United
States Army—the federal courts had jurisdiction because the soldierwas an officer of the U.S.
Army); see also Ex parteHill, 5 Nev. 154, 158 (Nev. 1869); In reHopson, 40 Barb. 34, 55 (N.Y.
1863); Ex parte Pool, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 276, 278 (Va. 1821).
285 See MARK E. NEELY, JR., LINCOLN AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATION:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 161–234 (2011). In Ex parte
Merryman, Chief Justice Taney in the Circuit Court of Maryland challenged President
Lincoln’s constitutional capacity to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. See Merryman, 17
F. Cas. at 144; CHARLES GROVE HAINES & FOSTER H. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-1864, at 454–66 (1957);
This drama—largely ignored by President Lincoln and leading to an unenforced writ of
attachment for contempt against him—reflected the deep uncertainty in the judiciary
regarding the President’s novel exercise of executive power. Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the
President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1688 (1997).
286 See HAINES & SHERWOOD, supra note 285, at 230–35, 237–38. Wisconsin’s
antislavery position caused the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine that the federal
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional. The Wisconsin Supreme Court thus
discharged on habeas corpus a man convicted under its provisions in federal court. In re
Booth 3 Wis. 1, 2 (Wis. 1854) rev’d sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506,
507–08 (1858). See also generally In re Bryan, 60 N.C. 1 (N.C. 1863) (North Carolina
Supreme Court insisted on concurrent jurisdiction for habeas corpus proceedings for
North Carolinians charged with desertion from the Confederate Army).
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The initial question arising in these habeas petitions was
whether state courts had jurisdiction over claims that a prisoner’s
custody under federal law was illegal. To resolve this fundamental
aspect of a federalist government, the U.S. Supreme Court stepped
inwith its decision inAbleman v. Booth,287 holding that state courts
lacked jurisdiction once the federal officer in charge of the
petitioner’s custody informed the state judge that the petitioner
was detained “under the authority of the United States.”288 In this
situation, the prisoner had to challenge the lawfulness of his
detention under federal law in the federal courts.289
Thenext question for the state courtswaswhat evidencewas
sufficient to demonstrate that a prisoner was held under the
authority of the United States—thereby stripping the state court of
jurisdiction over the prisoner’s habeas claim.290 Here, state courts
generally read in a requirement for legal process. An order by a court
or judicial officer was clearly sufficient.291 Courts were less certain
when a commissioner of the United States issued the process.292
Though U.S. commissioners were appointed by a court to support
the functioning of the court,293 they did not pass independent
287 Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 515–17 (1858).
288 Id. at 523 (“[A]fter the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially
apprized that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can
proceed no further.”).
289 Id. at 523.
290 Farrand, 8 F. Cas. at 1074–75 (“What the return of the marshal or other person
should contain in order to properly inform the state court that the prisoner is in custody under
authority of the United States, the supreme court do not say.”).
291 Id. at 1075; Hill, 5 Nev. at 158 (“[I]n every case where process, regular on its
face, has been issued from a court of the United States having power to issue process of
such a nature, the officer acting thereunder is fully protected against any interference from
a State court, while so acting; and that such court, when judicially informed of the existence
of the process, cannot go behind the same to make any further inquiry.”); Ohio & M.R. Co.
v. Fitch, 20 Ind. 498, 506 (1863) (“[W]e observe, neither the constitution of the United
States nor any act of Congress gives to the Federal Courts, in terms, exclusive jurisdiction
in such cases as have been mentioned; and Judge Nelson, of the United States Supreme
Court, in 1851, seems to rule that a holding under the authority of the United States, to
exclude the jurisdiction of the State Courts, must be a holding under legal process. He says:
‘In such a case, that is, when the prisoner is in fact held under process issued from a Federal
tribunal[.]’”(quoting Norris v. Newton, 5 McLean 92 (C.C.D. Ind. 1850)); Hopson, 40 Barb.
34, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863) (“No lawyer at this date will for a moment question the utter
incompetency of a state court to sit in judgment upon, and review and reverse a solemn
adjudication of a court of the United States.”).
292 Hopson, 40 Barb. at 57–58 (“I deny that the commissioner was in any sense
a judicial officer, or if he was, that his warrant partook in any respect of the nature of a
judicial process. He had passed no judicial judgment, he had exercised no judicial
function.”); Ex parte Pool, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 276, 284–85 (Va. 1821) (acknowledging the
authority of federal judicial officers but documenting a split among the courts about the
nature of the act of commitment by non-judicial officers, and whether this stripped state
courts of jurisdiction to review on habeas).
293 See McCabe, supra note 263, at 3–5; see also Court Officers and Staff:
Commissioners, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/administration/court-officers-
and-staff-commissioners [https://perma.cc/8S89-VY53].
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judgment on the validity of a warrant for arrest.294 In the context of
the Civil War, some courts accepted proof that prisoners were
subject to the Civil War Military Draft Act of 1863 issued by special
federal marshals and U.S. commissioners.295 The particularly high
stakes of the Civil War, which threatened the existence of the
sovereign, persuaded these courts to accept a statement from the
officer authorized by the federalmilitary law.296This exception to the
requirement of a formal warrant or judicial process was, however,
specific to the extreme circumstances of the Civil War.297
In the context of immigration detainers, even this
broadest group of statutes fails to authorize those civil arrests.
As with all of the “take custody” statutes, they address only the
power of local law enforcement officers to detain federal inmates;
they do not supply authority to arrest them. In addition, state
courts have traditionally read in a requirement for process to
find that a detainee is held under “the authority of the United
States.”298 Administrative warrants fall short as they are not
reviewed by any judicial officer.299 The exception made by some
states to allow for documents issued by specially authorized
294 Hopson, 40 Barb. at 57 (“[The commissioner] had passed no judicial
judgment, he had exercised no judicial function. The warrant issued by him was merely
the formal authority by which another officer was directed to effect the arrest, and to
deliver over the prisoner to be thereafter dealt with according to law.”).
295 Id. (arguing that the result in Ableman v. Booth would have been “precisely
the same if the marshal had arrested Booth without any warrant as with it. The warrant
was the mere machinery by which he was subjected to the action of a tribunal charged with
executing the law, or rather punishing for its violation. Is that of higher validity than the
act of congress that defined and created the offense? Here the law in one sense is self-
executing, or rather acts directly on the subject by authorizing the officer ex proprio vigore
to make the arrest, instead of creating an intermediate agency by which, on application, a
formal warrant or process might be issued, clothing the officer with a paper or parchment
authority deriving its whole vitality from the law itself.”); Farrand, 8 F. Cas. At 1070–71
(U.S. provost-marshal returned a statement that petitioner was in custody as a duly
enlisted Union soldier, in addition to “a copy of the enlistment of the soldier, which shows
that he was duly and regularly enlisted as a soldier in the army of the United States.”);
State v. Zulich, 29 N.J.L. 409, 410 (N.J. 1862) (U.S. marshal returned statement that
petitioner, an alleged underage soldier, was in custody as a duly enlisted Union soldier, in
addition to copies of the “special military orders” that directed the U.S. marshal to take the
petitioner into custody); Erwin v. United States, 37 F. 470, 486 (S.D. Ga. 1889) (“In regard
to commitments to await trial, it has been held that it is proper for a commissioner to issue
a writ of commitment on sending a prisoner to jail pending an examination. . . . And it has
been held that every writ of commitment must show sufficient cause on its face to justify
the jailer in holding the prisoner.”).
296 Hopson, 40 Barb. at 60–63 (Justice Bacon, writing about the need to trim back
state sovereignty in the face of so many other states being “[driven] in erratic courses out of
their true orbits . . . into bewildering chaos,” considered this concession to federal power to be
a necessity while “[t]he good ship of state [was] in the midst of a terrible tempest,” but that
“[w]hen we have outrode the storm, and are once more in a safe and quiet harbor, there will
be time enough to reconstruct the fallen masts, repair the tattered sails, and restore all that
is needful of the precious cargo,” i.e., the restoration of the age-old writ of habeas corpus.).
297 Id.
298 See supra notes 284–297 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
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marshals during the exigency of the Civil War is hard to square
with routine local enforcement of immigration detainers. This
exception occurred during an existential threat to the country.
Those courts that were willing to forego the normal requirement
for judicial process did so only in that context.300 Immigration
law already includes a provision that authorizes local law
enforcement agencies to administer federal immigration law
when the country is faced with a mass influx—a situation
arguably analogous to the crisis presented by the Civil War.301
State courts’ default position that judicial process is necessary
for custody to be “under the authority of the United States”
cannot be set aside in the name of routine immigration
enforcement. Were there an immigration emergency, local
enforcement powers are provided by federal law. Consequently,
there is no basis to abandon the historical requirement for
judicial process in these state custody statutes.
Several states have idiosyncratic versions of these centuries-
old laws. Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana,
Texas, and Wyoming each have unique statutes governing the
custody of federal inmates in state and county jails.302 These statutes
do not contain the phrases that implicitly or explicitly require court
action. Though the detention statutes in these seven states are
broad, they are still limited to receiving federal prisoners and
provide no additional arrest authority. Indeed, Arkansas’ statute
makes the requirement of an arrest by federal officers explicit.303
Montana’s legislative and statutory history also demonstrates that
the legislature retained the core requirements of legal process
despite changes to the statute’s text.304
300 See id.
301 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
302 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-503(g) (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-91 (West
2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353-101 (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:707 (2018); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 7-32-2203 (2019); TEX. GOV’TCODEANN. § 351.043 (West 2018); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 18-6-305 (West 2019). See Appendix for the text of these statutes.
303 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-41-503(g) (2018) (“Jails shall accept prisoners of the
United States Government provided space and staffing are available and the delivering
government agency agrees to pay a per diem charge not to exceed the actual costs, including
capital costs.” (emphasis added)).
304 Until 1989, Montana’s take-custody statute remained largely the same since
1895 and providing that jail officials “must receive, and keep in the county jail, any prisoner
committed thereto by process or order issued under the authority of the United States, until
he is discharged according to law, as if he had been committed under process issued under
the authority of this State; provision being made by the United States for the support of
such prisoner.” 1895 Montana Penal Code, p. 1221, sec. 3026; M.C.A. § 7-32-2206 (1987).
Montana’s code also referenced California’s decision on what constituted sufficient process.
See Mont. Rev. Code 1907, p. 900, sec. 9763 (citing to People v. Ah Teung) In 1989, an
overhaul of the detention center statutes was passed with the legislative purpose only of
making uniform the various payment systems involving different political subdivisions.See
An Act Generally Revising the Laws Relating to Jails, Jail Administrators, and Inmates,
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As a whole, the state statutes regulating cooperation of local
law enforcement in detaining individuals are silent with respect to
authorizing their arrests. As a threshold matter, they thus fail to
authorize the civil arrests detainers request. Further, most of these
“take custody” provisions contain key phrases that can be traced
back more than a century. State courts have in turn interpreted
these phrases to signify judicially issued documents. Consequently,
this collection of state laws conditions local cooperation in holding
federal prisoners on a court’s imprimatur—something immigration
detainers and administrative warrants cannot deliver.
C. Additional State Constitutional Protections
Federal constitutional challenges have driven much of the
evolution in DHS’s detainer policy. As described in Part I,
potential federal statutory and Fourth Amendment claims
remain, but courts are increasingly divided on whether the
revised detainer policy runs afoul of these provisions.305 State
constitutions, however, provide their own protections that are
often broader than those set out in the federal one. The rights
established by state constitutions are therefore important sources
of authority that can prohibit local enforcement of immigration
detainers even if the federal constitution does not.
In California, for example, the state constitution
guarantees the right to release pending trial on state criminal
charges, with several exceptions.306 This right is then reflected in
the state’s statutes creating a system of uniform countywide bails
that allow a defendant to leave custody after posting bail without
waiting to see a judge.307 In practice, however, local law
enforcement agencies often enforce detainers in a way that
prevents release on the bail set by a state’s criminal rules or
criminal courts.308 California receives themost detainer requests of
any state; therefore enforcing detainers in a manner that prevents
defendants from posting bond would violate the state
constitutional rights of tens of thousands of individuals.309 Indeed,
a group of immigrants in Los Angeles brought a class action to
challenge the county sheriff’s enforcement of detainers because it
Ch. 461, L. 1989 (Mont. Apr. 5, 1989); Minutes, Mon. Senate Cmte on Judiciary, at 8–9
(Feb. 17, 1989). The new iteration of the take-custody statute was moved to M.C.A. § 7-32-
2242(1). In the context of this statutory and legislative history, Montana’s modern take-
custody statute has not abandoned its long-standing requirement for “process or order.”
305 See supra notes 63–77 and accompanying text.
306 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
307 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1269b, 1295(a) (Deering 2018).
308 See supra Part II, notes 83–96 and accompanying text.
309 See Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
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interfered with their right to pre-trial release under the California
constitution.310 A federal district court granted summary judgment
to a sub-class on their state law bail claims, paving the way for
damage awards.311
California is not alone in establishing a right to pre-trial
release on bail for most state criminal charges. Seven of the ten
states receiving the highest volume of immigration detainers
provide their residents with similar guarantees.312 Twenty-four
states in all constitutionalize the right to pre-trial release on
bail.313 In these states, local law enforcement officers cannot
prolong the custody of residents after they have posted bail on
their criminal charges without violating their state
constitutions. Holding defendants pending trial on the basis of
an immigration detainer once bail has been posted would do just
that. State constitutional guarantees to pre-trial release thus
provide an independent safeguard against detainer enforcement
where local officers refuse to accept or honor the bond set in the
criminal case.
State corollaries to the Fourth Amendment can also affect
the ability of local officers to make civil immigration arrests. The
Pennsylvania and Idaho Supreme Courts, for instance, have
interpreted the rights of state residents against unreasonable
searches and seizures that go further than the Fourth Amendment
by rejecting the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.314
This exception provides that evidence obtained based on a warrant
that turns out to be invalid is nonetheless admissible if the officer
who was executing the warrant was acting in good faith.315
Even if Pennsylvania and Idaho law permitted local
officials to enforce civil administrative warrants, the states’
constitutions contain additional safeguards. In these states, county
310 See Roy v. Cty. of Los Angeles, CV 12-09012-BRO (FFMx), CV 13-04416-
BRO (FFMx), 2017 WL 2559616 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2017).
311 See Order re: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment at 43–44, Roy v. Cty. of L.A., CV 2:12-09012-AB, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018). https://
www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_roy_20180208_order_re_msjs.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3CN2-U8FT].
312 Of the top ten states with the highest number of detainers lodged, seven provide
a right to bail in their constitutions.See, in declining order of the state’s detainer volume, CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22; FLA. CONST. art I. § 14;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19; PENN. CONST. art. I § 14; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also Latest
Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
313 Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail,
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909, 969–96 (2013). West Virginia also protects the right to bail through
statute; Georgia, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and Hawaii, inter
alia, have provided through statute some form of right to bail. Id. at 927–31.
314 See Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. 1991); State v.
Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 661 (Idaho 1992).
315 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
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sheriffs and other officers who seize an individual based on a
defective warrant cannot rely on their good faith in the warrant’s
validity to avoid the consequences of an unlawful search or
seizure.316 This more protective interpretation is significant in the
context of immigration detainers because DHS repeatedly errs in
who it detains and deports.317 A recent investigation into the
common practices of ICE field offices in issuing detainers revealed
that thousands of detainers are likely invalid.318 Yet local law
enforcement officers have no way to discern which detainers
comply with federal requirements.319 Pennsylvania ranks ninth in
the number of detainers lodged; together Pennsylvania and Idaho
have received over fifty-six thousand detainers.320 If local officers
cannot rely in good faith on the validity of administrative warrants
and detainers, they instead become liable for DHS’s errors.
In sum, with a narrowing set of federal law claims, the
salient obstacle to local civil immigration arrests has become
these historical limitations on local arrest and detention power.
With a federal statutory scheme that permits, but cannot
require, detainer enforcement, the ability of local resources to
carry out federal policy depends on century-old provisions that
316 Guzman, 842 P.2d at 666. Idaho’s Constitution offers broader protection to
citizens than the Bill of Rights in the federal Constitution in more than just the Fourth
Amendment search-and-seizure context. See generally Byron J. Johnson, The Shah of
Persia v. the Pope’s Decree: Can the Shah of Persia (The United States Supreme Court)
Interfere with the Pope’s Decree (The Idaho Constitution) As Interpreted by the Idaho
Supreme Court?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 391 (1995) (discussing Idaho’s historical Constitution
provisions and comparable Bill of Rights provisions).
317 These errors include wrongly detaining and deporting U.S. citizens. On average,
one hundred and fifty Americans are mistakenly detained for deportation proceedings every
year, but—alongside noncitizens—are not constitutionally entitled to counsel. Steve Coll,When
ICE Tries to Deport Americans, Who Defends Them?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2018), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/when-ice-tries-to-deport-americans-who-defends-
them [https://perma.cc/W99A-VPRN]; see alsoEshaBhandari,U.S.CitizenWrongfullyDeported
toMexico, Settles His Case Against the Federal Government, AM.CIV. LIB.UNION (Oct. 5, 2012),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/us-citizen-wrongfully-deported-mexico-settles-his-case-
against-federal-government [https://perma.cc/KM9L-EEDD]; Camila Domonoske, U.S. Citizen
Who Was Held by ICE for 3 Years Denied Compensation by Appeals Court, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/01/540903038/u-s-citizen-held-
by-immigration-for-3-years-denied-compensation-by-appeals-court [https://perma.cc/5K76-AZB
K]; Wendy Feliz, United States Agrees to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Wrongful Deportation, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (July 2, 2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/news/united-
states-agrees-settle-lawsuit-alleging-wrongful-deportation [https://perma.cc/ER4Z-MLQZ]; Joel
Rubin & Paige St. John,How aU.S. CitizenWasMistakenly Targeted for Deportation. He’s Not
Alone, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ice-citizen-arrest-
20171129-story.html [https://perma.cc/M9MC-QB4A]; U.S. Citizen Sues Government After
Being Detained by Immigration Officials for 7 Months, RUSSIA TODAY (Oct. 22, 2013), https://
www.rt.com/usa/ice-complaint-yost-lawsuit-558/ [https://perma.cc/898A-NMW3].
318 Bob Ortega, ICE Supervisors Sometimes Skip Required Review of Detention
Warrants, Emails Show, CNN (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/us/ice-supervis
ors-dont-always-review-deportation-warrants-invs/index.html [https://perma.cc/78U3-HP9Z].
319 Id.
320 Latest Data: TRAC, supra note 25.
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define state law enforcement authority and protect residents
from its abuse. In most states, these laws make clear that
enforcing federal civil statutes without a judicial order falls
outside the scope of local law enforcement authority. Two
conclusions result. First, state law is an increasingly effective
source of challenge to detainer enforcement. Second, to enforce
detainers, states would need to depart from convention and pass
laws that enlarge the role of local law enforcement.
D. In Praise of the Status Quo
Expanding the scope of local law enforcement authority
has the effect of placing control over federal immigration
enforcement in the hands of the state or local officer encountering
the immigrant.321 Federal officials may be lodging the detainers,
but the real enforcement decision is made by a line-level officer
serving a different sovereign. It is the deputy sheriff’s decision to
stop someone, investigate status, arrest him or her, and enforce
an ensuing detainer that sets the process of immigration
prosecution in motion. The historical limits in state law preclude
this exercise of discretion by local law enforcement. This section
argues that maintaining state law’s long-established constraints
is necessary for uniformity, transparency, and accountability in
federal immigration enforcement policy. More importantly, these
historical limitations guard against the civil rights violations the
Trump administration’s policies promote.
Local discretion over immigration enforcement comes at a
cost. On a systemic level, locating control over detainer
enforcement with states erodes the values of a federalist
structure.322 By eliminating the divide between federal and local
enforcement authority, individuals lose “one of the Constitution’s
structural protections of liberty.”323 Dividing power between these
two political entities reduces “the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front.”324 When this separation of authority collapses with
state and local officers performing front-line immigration arrests,
321 See Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of
Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L.REV. 1259, 1275 (2015) (describing how “[t]he combination
of the unrestricted use of the law enforcement databases and the immigration detainer
created a double devolution of discretion to line immigration agents and police officers” with
“a de facto delegation of priority-setting power from the top of the executive branch all the
way down to the lowest level of the federal and state law enforcement hierarchy”).
322 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018).
323 Id. at 1477 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
324 Id. (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182–82 (1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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individual liberty suffers. The Trumpadministration’s express goal
is to increase the number of arrests and prosecutions for
immigration violations by employing state and local officials. 325
Residents in cooperating jurisdictions face the risk of arrest not
only by the federal agents charged with enforcing immigration law
but also by the much larger force of state and local officers. These
state and local officials then multiply the rate of abuse and error
already prevalent in federal enforcement efforts.326 Restricting
federal immigration enforcement to federal officials creates a
structural limit on the number of people subjected to arrest,
detention, and their accompanying abuse.
Eliminating state law constraints likewise hinders political
accountability for immigration policy. State and local officers
become the face of the federal government’s commitment to mass
deportation. Consequently, “responsibility for the benefits and
burdens of the regulation” cannot be readily assigned.327
Immigration enforcement by local officers obscures the role of
federal policymakers in arresting and deporting long-term
residents. Voters dissatisfied with the loss of discretion and
priorities in current immigration policy must differentiate those
responsible for creating the policy from those responsible for
implementing it. While policymakers at both levels bear
responsibility for these choices, enacting state laws that allow local
officers to enforce federal immigration law makes it more difficult
for voters to know whom to hold accountable.
The loss of traditional limitations in state law also enables a
system of piecemeal immigration enforcement. Such a system
undermines uniformity and federal supremacy in immigration law.
If some local law enforcement officers are empowered by new state
laws to make immigration arrests, immigrants in the jurisdictions
that employ those powers are farmore likely to get funneled into the
325 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,799–80 (Jan. 25, 2017) (stating
that one of the goals of the order was to “direct executive departments and agencies [] to
employ all lawful means to enforce the immigration laws of the United States[,]” by
“empower[ing] State and local law enforcement agencies across the country to perform the
functions of an immigration officer in the interior of theUnited States to themaximumextent
permitted by law”); Kelly Memo, supra note 1. See Naomi Doraisamy, Erasing Presence
through Reasonable Suspicion: Terry and its Progeny as a Vehicle for State Immigration
Enforcement, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 410, 410 n.2 (2018) (describing the function of local law
enforcement in detecting unauthorized immigration: “The solution is to create ‘virtual choke
points’ . . . . [like] firewalls in computer systems, that people could pass through only if their
legal status is verified. The objective is not mainly to identify illegal aliens for arrest (though
that will always be a possibility) but rather to make it as difficult as possible for illegal aliens
to live a normal life here.”) (quoting Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A
Strategy of Attrition through Enforcement, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 5 (May 2005), https://
www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2005/back605.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAV3-J684].
326 See discussion supra Part II notes 118–121, 317–319 and accompanying text.
327 Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477.
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deportation system than immigrants in other parts of the country.
The scope of immigration enforcement would thus vary state by
state. Furthermore, enacting state laws to promote immigration
arrests by state and local officers repudiates the role of Congress in
establishing the scope of immigration enforcement.328 Detainers
arise from a resource gap that Congress created and controls. The
Trump administration relies on detainers to compensate for the
limited capacity of his 5,800 ICE agents. Though President Trump
has sought additional resources for enforcement, Congress has
refused to fully fund his request.329 Congress’s decision not to act in
an area of law over which it has exclusive authority reflects
legislative intent as much as a decision to act. Amending state law
to permit local officers to enter the breach subverts this federal
system. The result is, in effect, border control by the states—a
system squarely rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.330
Finally, the costs of expanded local law enforcement
authority on immigrant families and those perceived to be
immigrants are especially great. Though federal officials issue the
detainers, local officers make the decisions to trigger and enforce
them.331 This delegation of discretion comes with few mechanisms
for oversight.332 Indeed, mounting evidence shows that local
immigration enforcement authority results in racial-profiling,
longer pre-trial detention, more severe criminal convictions, and
stiffer penalties.333 Further, the larger the Latinx population, the
more likely they will experience these effects, notwithstanding
the political will of the electorate.334 Faced with a patchwork of
state laws, immigrant families must navigate their way through
friendly and hostile jurisdictions to avoid these consequences.335
328 Arizonav.UnitedStates, 567U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (“The federal power to determine
immigration policy is well settled . . . . It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about
the status, safety, and security of their nationals in theUnited Statesmust be able to confer and
communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”).
329 Jeff Stein & Mike DeBonis, Senate Approves Deal on Disaster Aid, Leaves




330 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 417-24 (2012) (Scalia, J. concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the power to regulate immigration is not exclusive
to the federal government).
331 Cf. Stumpf, supra note 321, at 1262.
332 See id.
333 See discussion supra notes 90–117 and accompanying text.
334 See discussion supra notes 113–117.
335 Cf. VICTOR HUGO GREEN, THE NEGRO MOTORIST GREEN BOOK (1936). The
guide described places and services friendly to African American drivers trying to travel
amid state and local discrimination policies. The Green Book became “the bible of black
travel during Jim Crow” by identifying places that would serve them along the road. J.
Freedom du Lac, Guidebook That Aided Black Travelers During Segregation Reveals
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State limitations on local law enforcement authority, which
preclude immigration arrests, provide a historical basis to limit
detainer enforcement and protect the civil rights of immigrants. To
be effective, however, states must not only preserve these
constraints but also enforce them.State laws that break fromhistory
and allow local immigration arrests are the anomalies.336 Yet local
law enforcement officers in jurisdictions throughout the country
routinely enforce detainers despite state law to the contrary.337 A
growing body of cases, though, reveal the power of these laws to
confine local and federal enforcement resources to their respective
spheres.338 By enforcing state laws that prohibit immigration
arrests, local policymakers, courts, and advocates can restore the
proper balance between federal and local law enforcement authority.
In doing so, these actors can protect the liberty interests of
immigrant residents, promote political accountability for federal
immigration policy, and locate responsibility for enforcement
resources with Congress. Moreover, preserving the traditional scope
of local police power avoids thewidespread abuses local immigration
enforcement entails.
CONCLUSION
Immigration detainers are on the rise as the Trump
administration pursues every available resource for immigration
enforcement. Their effect is to turn any contact with local law
enforcement officers into a gamble on one’s future in the United
States. Consequently, detainer enforcement remains a touchstone of
disputes over local control and federal power. At the same time, a
decade of court battles has created a detainer policy that may prove
resilient to future federal law challenges. A series of recent decisions,
however, illustrate the emerging significance of state law. An in-
Vastly Different D.C., WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/11/AR2010091105358.html [https://perma.cc/B6W9-E63L].
336 See Ariz. S.B. 1070, Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods
Act (2010); S.B. 4, 85th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2017); see also Iowa S.F. 481, An Act Relating to
the Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Providing Penalties and Remedies, Including
the Denial of State Funds to Certain Entities (2018) (requiring compliance with
detainers and prohibiting sanctuary policies); Tenn. H.B. 2315, An Act to Amend
Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 4; Title 7; Title 8; Title 9; Title 38; Title 39 and Title
40, Relative to Immigration (2018) (codified at Pub. Ch. 973) (same).
337 National Map of Local Entanglement with ICE, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR.,
https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map [https://perma.cc/WWC7-VZFQ].
338 See, e.g., Cisneros v. Elder, No. 18-CV-30549, 2018 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 3388, at
*2 (Dist. Ct. Colo. El Paso Cty. Dec. 6, 2018); C.F.C. v. Miami-Dade Cty, 349 F. Supp. 3d.
1236, 1245 (S.D. Fla. 2018); Creedle v. Miami-Dade Cty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1286 (S.D.
Fla. 2018); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1146 (Mass. 2017); Esparza v. Nobles
Cty, No. 53-CV-18-751, 2018 WL 6263254 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 19, 2018); People ex rel.
Wells v. DeMarco, 88 N.Y.S.3d 518, 522 (App. Div. 2018).
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depth review of provisions common in state law and their historical
interpretations demonstrates that traditional state law constraints
on local law enforcement authority should preclude the use of
detainers. Some states, such as Texas, have overcome those limits
by expanding the authority of state and local officers to include
immigration arrests. The accompanying costs are substantial.
In an era in which every immigration violation is a priority
for prosecution, expanding the scope of local law enforcement has
the effect of delegating discretion over federal immigration
enforcement to state and local officers. The benefits to individual
liberty, political accountability, and resource control that flow from
separating state and federal policy are therefore lost. Moreover, in
jurisdictions that authorize local immigration enforcement,
immigrant communities are more likely to experience racial-
profiling, more likely to be screened for status in every law
enforcement encounter, and less likely to trust law enforcement
officers to keep them safe. Retaining the traditional constraints on
law enforcement power that are contained in state law can and
should provide an important safeguard against this discrimination.
Their true power, though, requires states, counties, and localities to
respect these long-standing limitations and restrain their officers
from participating in the further erosion of immigrants’ civil rights.
